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EMPLOYMENT RELATION: COMMON-LAW CONCEPT
AND LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION
BENJAMIN S. ASIAt
ONE of the crucial problems faced in unemployment compensation
legislation was the drafting of provisions which would insure coverage
of those intended to receive benefits under the program. In different
areas of law, lines of demarcation between those who are clearly em-
ployees and those who are entrepreneurs have been drawn at varying
points. The courts in the formulation of the master-servant relation-
ship for purposes of the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior,
and in the interpretation of workmen's compensation statutes, have
long wrestled with the problem of the nature and bounds of the em-
ployment relationship. It was necessary for draftsmen of the defini-
tion of "employment" in unemployment compensation statutes to
project any choice of alternatives of language against the backdrop
provided in those fields in order to anticipate in so far as possible, and
thereby obviate, any carryover of distinctions which would have no
place in unemployment compensation. This article is concerned with
the nature of the definitions of the employment relationship which
were incorporated in unemployment compensation laws, and the
degree of success of the effort to formulate a specialized definition for
unemployment compensation purposes.
This discussion is arranged in five parts: first, the nature of the
common-law master-servant relationship, its historical background
and its relevance for unemployment compensation purposes; second,
special definitions of the employment relation contained in unemploy-
ment compensation laws; third, the manner in which such definitions
have been interpreted by the courts; fourth, the judicial interpretation
of unemployment compensation laws not containing such special
definitions; and, finally, the implications of the decision of the Supreme
Court in National Labor Relations Board v. Iearst Publications, Inc.,I
upon the future interpretations of employment relation definitions in
unemployment compensation statutes.
THE COMON-LAW MASTER-SERVANT RELATIONSHIP
At the beginning of the last century it was considered just to impose
liability upon an entrepreneur for all harms tortiously committed in the
course of services performed for him even though the actor was what
later came to be called an "independent contractor," or the servant of
t Senior Attorney, Federal Security Agency.
1. 322 U. S. 111 (1944), reh'g denied, 322 U. S. 769 (1944).
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an independent contractor.2 Not until 1826 did a court carve out of
that general liability an immunity of the principal where he procured
services by engaging an independent contractor.3 In the development
of this exception to the prior general rule of liability, whether the rela-
tionship of "independent contractor" existed depended principally, if
not solely, on whether in the performance of the services the alleged
independent contractor was in the pursuit of an independent calling.4
So considered, one who, with respect to the services in question, is not
engaged in an independent calling would remain a "servant" of the
principal. Whether or not the principal possessed a right of control
over the actor in the performance of the services came to be discussed
in the cases, but more as an explanation for not holding the principal
liable where an independent contractor relationship existed than as a
test of the existence of that relationship. But in time the test of con-
trol became the most prominent, if not the controlling criterion, and
the concept of independent contractor was modified to include persons
who were not subject to control even though they were not engaged in
an independent calling.
The Restatement of the Law of Agency, in discussing rules for
recovery against a principal for injuries caused by the tortious conduct
of his servants, defines the master-servant relationship as follows:
"(1) A servant is a person employed to perform service for an-
other in his affairs and who, with respect to his physical conduct in
the performance of the service, is subject to the other's control or
right to control.
"(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant
or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among
others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the mas-
ter may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in
the locality, the work is usually done under the direc-
tion of the employer or by a specialist without supervi-
sion;
2. In Bush v. Steinman, 1 Bos. & P. 404, 126 Eng. Rep. R. 978 (C. P. 1799), the gen-
era] employer was held liable for harm caused by a servant of a subcontractor of a contractor
who had been engaged to repair the general employer's house. &e diccusions of this cac2 in
Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Emp!oyer of an Idependcr! Cortradr (1935)
10 IND. L. J. 494, 497; Stevens, The Test of the Employni Rdation (1939) 33 Mich. L.
Rv. 188, 195; Wolfe, Determination of Emp!oycr-Employce Rclationships in Soeral Legsi-
lion (1941) 41 COL. L. RE,.. 1015, 1021.
3. Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547, 103 Eng. Rep. R. 204, 207 (K. B. 1826), dis-
cussed in Harper, supra note 2, at 497; Stevens, supra note 2, at 192.
4. Thus, in Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547, 555, 10S Eng. Rep. R. 204, 207 (K. B.
1826), Littledale, J., said that a "jobman was a person carring on a distinct employment
of his own, in which he furnished men and let out horses . . . to all such parcons as chove
to employ him . . .", and, therefore, was an independent contractor.
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(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the in-
strumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the per-
son doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the
job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business
of the employer; and
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relationship of master and servant." I
It will be noted that the so-called "control test" prescribed in para-
graph (1) of Section 220 is stated as the governing criterion and that
the factors listed in paragraph (2) appear to serve merely as factual
bases from which inferences are to be drawn as to whether the control
test is satisfied.8 Some of the cases, however, do not conceive of the
control test as the sole ultimate criterion, but rather seem to consider
the second subsidiary factor, whether the one employed is engaged in
a distinct occupation or business in the course of which he performs
services for the principal, as a factor of independent and predominant
significance.7 There is also a difference of view as to the content of the
control test itself. Some courts insist upon a right to control all details
of the physical performance, while others are satisfied with a showing
that the principal has a "general control" over the person engaged.8
5. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 220. The Restatement adopts the substance, and
in some respects almost the exact wording, of the factors described in the leading case,
Murray's Case, 130 Me. 181, 154 Atl. 352 (1931); cf. factors (b), (e), (f), (g), and (h) of
§ 220(2) of the Restatement with factors (2), (4), (6), (7), and (8) in Murray's Case. See
also Kinsman v. Hartford Courant Co., 94 Conn. 156, 108 Atl. 562 (1919); Neece v. Lee,
129 Neb. 561, 262 N. W. 1 (1935); American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Denke, 128 Tex. 229, 95 S. W.
(2d) 370 (1936); Stockwell v. Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P. (2d) 189 (1933).
6. But see note 14 infra.
7. In Mullich v. Brocker, 119 Mo. App. 332, 338-9, 97 S. W. 549, 551 (1905) the
court concluded: "It looks like the employee must have a calling in which it is fair to pre-
sume he has developed skill, before he will be regarded otherwise than as a servant. . . . he
must hold himself out as having an occupation with which he is familiar." Regarding the
control factor the court rejected the proposition that ". . . a person not especially qualified
for a particular service, but ready to undertake any job which may be offered to him . . .
becomes, when hired for some job, an independent contractor, simply because the employer
relinquishes control over the work and trusts it to the employee's discretion." See Maltz v.
Jackoway-Katz Cap Co., 336 Mo. 1000, 1013, 82 S. W. (2d) 909, 917 (1935); Southern
Cotton Oil Co. v. Wallace, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 12, 16, 54 S. W. 638, 641 (1899).
8. In Aisenberg v. C. F. Adams Co., 95 Conn. 419, 111 At]. 591 (1920) (workmen's
compensation case applying common-law criteria), a commission salesman was free from
control as to hours, method of transportation employed, prospects called upon, and territory
covered. The court, applying common-law tests, held him to be an employee, stating: "The
subject of sale, the terms of sale, and the proceeds of sale, remained in the control of the
Company. Practically this constituted a general control." Id. at 422, 111 Atl. at 592. Fol-
lowed in Lassen v. Stamford Transit Co., 102 Conn. 76, 128 Ati. 117 (1925) (negligence
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And some courts have held that the retention by the employer of a
right of control over the physical performance of services is not a pre-
requisite at all, at least where it would seem an inconvenient or ineffi-
case); Buell v. Danaher, 127 Conn. 606, 13 A. (2d) 697 (1941) (unemployment compsnsa-
tion coverage). See Burgess v. Garvin, 219 Mo. App. 162, 272 S. W. 10S (1925) (negligence
case, commission salesman); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518 (18S9) (negligence caZe,
commission salesman); U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lovry, 231 S. W. 818 (Ten. Civ.
App. 1921) (workmen's compensation, commission salesman); Chatelain v. Thacheray, 93
Utah 525, 100 P. (2d) 191 (1940) (automobile negligence case, commission insurance cales-
man); Dillon v. Prudential Ins. Co., 75 Cal. App. 266, 242 Pac. 736 (1925).
The power of the principal to discharge the employee at will or upon short notice has
been given greater prominence by many courts than is indicated by the Restatement. L. B.
Price Mercantile Co. v. Industrial Comm., 43 Ariz. 257, 30 P. (2d) 491 (1934); Press Pub-
lishing Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 190 Cal. 114, 210 Pac. 820 (1922); N. Y. In-
demnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., SO Cal. App. 713, 252 Pac. 775 (1927); Indus-
trial Comm. v. Hammond, 77 Colo. 414, 236 Pac. 1006 (1925); Industrial Comm. v. Bonfil:,
78 Colo. 306, 241 Pac. 735 (1925); Aisenberg v. C. F. Adams Co., 95 Conn. 419, 111 At.
591 (1920); Franklin Coal and Coke Co. v. Industrial Comm., 296 III. 329, 129 N. E. 811
(1921); Clark's Case, 124 Me. 47, 126 AtI. 18 (1924); Matter of Glielmi v. Netherland Dairy
Co., 254 N. Y. 60, 171 N. E. 906 (1930); Journal Pub. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm.,
155 P. (2d) 570 (Ore. 1945); Cockran v. Rice, 26 S. D. 393, 128 N. W. 583 (1910). The fol-
loving statement, from 14 RuLING CASE LAW 72, is often quoted in the cases: "The power
of an employer to terminate the employment at any time is incompatible with the full
control of the work which is usually enjoyed by an independent contractor, and hence is
considered as a strong circumstance tending to show the subserviency of the employee.
Indeed, it has been said that no single fact is more conclusive, perhaps, than the unre-
stricted right of the employer to end the particular service whenever he chooses, without
regard to the final result of the work itself." Some courts have held it to be the most impor-
tant of all factors. L. B. Price Mercantile Co. v. Industrial Comm., 43 Ariz. 257,30 P. (2d)
491 (1934); Industrial Comm. v. Bonfils, 78 Colo. 306, 241 Pac. 735 (1925). In the Boef"ls
case the court concluded: "By virtue of its power to discharge, the company could at any
moment direct the minutest detail and method of the work." Id. at 308, 241 Pac. at 736.
Perhaps in emphasizing the power of discharge the courts are really thinldng of the economic
dependence of the worker. In Speculations as to "Respondcat Superior" in HArVARD LEGAL
EssAYs (1934) 433, 458, n. 9, Professor Seavey concludes, "It is quite true that in most of
the master and servant situations there is no physical control by the master, but the rela-
tionship carries -with it a power of control over the servant through his economic subjec-
tion. .. ."
A closelyrelated factor which has also been accorded very great weight by many courts is
whether the person employed is engaged for the performance of a specific piece of work and
has a contract right to complete the work. In Coclkan v. Rice, 26 S. D. 393, 123 N. W. 53
(1910), the court concluded that the contract is one of employment unless it is for a certain
definite and specified result, and contemplates a definite beginning, continuance, and end-
ing. In Industrial Comm. v. Bonfils, 73 Colo. 306, 309, 241 Pac. 735, 736 (1925), the court
illustrated the relationship of this factor to the power of discharge and to the control test:
"If I hire Smith to plow for me at $4.00 per acre he is my servant; if Smith agrees to plow
my 20 acres at four dollars per acre and I agree to pay him that sum for it lie is an inde-
pendent contractor. In the first case I can discharge him at will and therefore control him.
In the second I cannot discharge him or control him except as to result." See Aisenberg v.
C. F. Adams Co., 95 Conn. 419, 111 At. 591 (1920); Burruss v. B. M. C. Logging Co.,
38 N. Al. 254, 31 P. (2d) 263 (1934); Beach v. Velzy, 238 N. Y. 100, 143 N. E. 805 (1924).
1945]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
cient arrangement, or where the skill of the employee makes it un-
necessary.9
The soundness of insulating a general employer from liability on the
basis of the control test has been severely criticized. Some critics have
desired a much greater emphasis on the independent-calling test,
making it either controlling or at least independently significant.10
9. For a situation in which the inconvenience of control by employer made it unnec-
essary, see Mullich v. Brocker, 119 Mo. App. 332, 97 S. W. 549 (1905). In Allied Mutuals
Liability Ins. Co. v. De Jong, 209 App. Div. 505, 205 N. Y. Supp. 165 (1st Dep't 1924)
(workmen's compensation) an industrial homeworker was held an employee, the court
stating: "One may be sent into a forest to fell trees or be sent to his home to sew garments,
and in either case be none the less an employee. If the employer chooses to order work so
done as to waive supervision, this does not make the employee less an employee." Id. at 507,
205 N. Y. Supp. at 167. Accord: Fischer v. Industrial Comm., 301 Ill. 621, 134 N. E. 114
(1922); Andrews v. Commodore Knitting Mills, Inc., 257 App. Div. 515, 13 N. Y. S. (2d)
577 (3d Dep't 1939). In Kaus v. Huston, 35 F. Supp. 327, 331 (N. D. Iowa 1940) the court
concluded, ". . . there is no discretion vested in the [taxi] drivers inconsistent with the
relation of master and servant. From the very nature of the case the drivers, in order to
perform their duties properly, must exercise very complete control over the cabs while they
have them out on their shifts."
For cases in which skill of employee made retention of control unnecessary, see United
States v. Butler, 49 F. (2d) 52 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) (lawyer); Matter of Bernstein, 236 N. Y.
268, 140 N. E. 694 (1923) (physician).
10. The decisiveness of the independent calling test appears principally in commission
salesmen cases; it is largely in such cases that courts seem to have the most difficulty in
clearly explaining and consistently applying the control test. It has been suggested that the
control test, although it may have been appropriate in the early part of the industrial era,
no longer meets the realities of modern business organization.
. .. expansion of industrial organizations in size and function have been
accompanied by a considerable decentralization of authority and delegation of
duties. This process is graphically illustrated by the status of salesmen. The grad-
ual elimination of the jobber or wholesaler has been paralleled by an enormous in-
crease in the sales organizations of manufacturing establishments which themselves
now undertake the function of distribution either to the retailer or directly to the
consumer. Companies manufacturing various types of home appliances, apparel,
or food products frequently build up large forces of dealers, distributors, and agents
who are subject to only such controls as seem practicable considering the nature of
the job and the geographical scope of their operations. . . .They may have con-
siderable latitude of discretion as to means of transportation, hours of work, and
methods of selling, but standards will frequently be 'suggested' by the company
concerned, a deviation from which, accompanied by a failure to make the volume
of sales expected, can result in immediate dismissal. ...
". .. In many cases it seems clear that the nature of the services are such, or
they are performed at such a distance from the alleged employer, that any at-
tempted exercise of the right [of control] would be impracticable although they are
performed in the course of furthering the business of another and not in an inde-
pendently established business of the person who performed them."
Issues Involved in Determining Eligibility Under the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Program
in SOCIAL SECURITY YEARBOOK: 1941 (1942) 47, 49, 51. Leidy, Salesmen as Independent
Contractors (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 365, 375, proposes that the independent calling test be
given primary weight. See also Wolfe, supra note 2, at 1024.
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The question seems to be largely one of premises. The emphasis on
control seems more in harmony with the notion of fault, "the supposed
basis of liability for torts of negligence," 11 or the purpose of holding
liable those in a position to minimize risk.'12 The emphasis upon inde-
pendent calling, on the other hand, would perhaps be more in harmony
with the purpose of securing persons against the risk of serious loss
from tortious harms by distributing the loss more widely.13
The specifications of factors by the Restatement and in the numerous
court decisions do not provide any precise formula for their applica-
tion.14 As is the case in many other areas of law, it is easier to state the
rule than to apply it. The result in a particular case is governed by a
weighing of all the factors in the light of the facts, and is almost com-
pletely "a matter of judgment." It is not surprising, therefore, to find
differences in result where the fact situations differ very little, because
courts conceive differently the factors to be applied and give them
greatly varying weights. 15
11. Steffen, Izdependent Contractor and the Good Life (1935) 2 U. or Cm. L. Rtv. 501,
506. This does not explain adequately the large area in which the employer, even when
circumspect in the choice of servants, has been held liable for the latter's unauthorized
wrongs. See Neuner, Respondcat Superior in the Light of Comparalire Law (1941) 4 LA. L.
Rnv. 1, 7, in which the author concludes, ". . . a legal rule which males the mastcr's lia-
bility depend upon his own negligence introduces an element of unreality and uncertainty
into the law beyond all tolerable limits. It is unrealistic to require a degree of care in s lec-
tion and control which as a practical matter cannot be exercised."
12. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Rish (1929) 33 Y,%c L. J 524,
587-8, 598, 601 ("risk prevention"). It is questionable whether the doctrine c rvez a3 a
preventive influence rather than as an ex post facto determination of who shall bear the lo:e.
See Harper, supra note 2, at 498.
13. Harper, supra note 2, at 500, suggests that the immunity of an employer of an inde-
pendent contractor may be progressively limited and eventually eliminated in favor of
persons injured in the conduct of the employer's affairs. Neuner, supra note 11, at 21-2
proposes, as the most rational test, that the entrepreneur be liable for injuries caused by all
persons engaged by him except other entrepreneurs, while the consumer (e.g., a hou_:eife
engaging a plumber for repair work) should be liable only for harmful acts of servants in the
popular sense of the word. See Sinclair v. Perma-Maid Co., 345 Pa. 280, 26 A. (2d) 924
(1942) in which defendant corporation was held liable for injuries causd by the negligent
operation of an automobile owned and driven by its salesman who was engaged on a com-
mission basis to demonstrate its line of utensils. The court held that because the ue of the
automobile was of "vital importance" to the company in furthering the company's buinezs,
it could be inferred that actual or potential control was rezerved. Note (1942) 3 U. o7
Pirrs. L. REv. 270.
14. The Restatement observes: "The relationship of master and servant is one not
capable of exact definition ... . It cannot ... be defined in general terms with sub-
stantial accuracy. The factors stated in Subsection (2) are all considered in determining the
question, and it is for the triers of fact to determine whether or not there is a sufficient group
of favorable factors to establish the relationship." RESTATMIENT, AGENCY (1933) § 220,
Comment (1)b.
15. In Burchett v. Department of Labor, 146 Wash. 85, 89-9, 261 Pac. 802, 803-4
(1927), the court stated, "The distinction between an employee or servant and an inde-
1945]
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Nor do definitions governing coverage under workmen's compensa-
tion statutes offer much guidance. They generally are not elaborate
but consist simply of words ("employee," "employer," "contract of
hire," "employment") which are well known in the common-law cases.
As a consequence the courts, in the interpretation and application of
the definitions, resort to the master-servant relationship commonly
applied in the law of respondeat superior."6 Some courts, deferring to
the remedial purpose of such legislation, have inclined in doubtful
cases to resolve the doubt in favor of the worker,' 7 and a few judges
have urged that statutes not departing substantially from others in
definition have a broader coverage than the master-servant relation-
ship.18
DEFINITION OF "EMPLOYMENT" IN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
STATUTES
The tests for determining who is an employee for purposes of the
doctrine of respondeat superior should of course be consistent with the
purposes which that doctrine is conceived to achieve, and should be
modified as social policy dictates that the purposes be modified. Thus,
the control test may logically be employed as the touchstone of re-
spondeat superior if the distribution of risk is to be administered on the
theory of holding principals who are at fault or in a position to mini-
mize risk, and if such a test is conceived to serve such a purpose. But
such a test has no necessary relation to the purposes of a program whose
object is to insure against the risk of unemployment and compensate
unemployed persons for their wage loss."' For example, even assuming
pendent contractor has been considered by the courts in numberless cases, but no statement
of the rule has yet been made which perfectly fits every case .... While we have read tile
great many cases cited by the parties in their briefs, and others to which they referred, the
confusion is so great and distinctions so intricate that we see no benefit in citing or discuss-
ing them."
16. Birmingham Post Co. v. Sturgeon, 227 Ala. 162, 149 So. 74 (1933); County of Los
Angeles v. Industrial Accident Comm., 123 Cal. App. 12, 11 P. (2d) 434 (1932); Press Pub.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 190 Cal. 114, 210 Pac. 820 (1922); VanWatermeullen v.
Industrial Comm., 343 I1. 73, 174 N. E. 846 (1931); Hayes v. Board of Trustees, 224 N. C.
11, 29 S. E. (2d) 137 (1944); Hinds v. Department of Labor and Industries, 150 Wash. 230,
272 Pac. 734 (1928); Note (1926) 43 A. L. R. 335, 346.
17. See notably Hight v. Industrial Comm., 44 Ariz. 129, 34 P. (2d) 404 (1934); Mar-
shall Field & Co. v. Industrial Comm., 285 Ill. 333, 120 N. E. 773 (1918); Fischer v. Indus-
trial Comm., 301 Ill. 621, 134 N. E. 114 (1922); Meek v. Julian, 219 Ind. 83, 36 N. E. (2d)
854 (1941); Allied Mutuals Liability Ins. Co. v. De Jong, 209 App. Div. 505, 205 N. Y. Supp.
165 (1st Dep't 1924).
18. See discussion in Matter of Rheinwald, 168 App. Div. 425, 153 N. Y. S. 598 (3d
Dep't 1915), award rev'd, 174 App. Div. 935, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1143 (3d Dep't 1916), aff'd,
223 N. Y. 572, 119 N. E. 1074 (1918); and Judge Wolfe's dissent in Stover Bedding Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 99 Utah 423, 428, 107 P. (2d) 1027, 1029 (1940).
19. See Comment (1942) 36 ILL. L. REv. 873.
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that an employer is in a position to minimize the risk of unemploy-
ment,2 his power to do so is in no manner related to whether he retains
a quantity or quality of control which meets respondeat superior tests.
The fact that an employee is left largely to his own devices in perform-
ing services in the furtherance of his principal's business does not lessen
his dependence for his economic survival upon the continuance of the
employment and the remuneration flowing therefrom. If the risk of
causing tortious harm to others may be minimized substantially by
controlling the employee's performance of services, the risk of insecurity
of the employee cannot. And if the placing of considerable discretion
in the employee in the performance of his duties lessens the employer's
responsibility for tortious injuries, it cannot lessen the employee's re-
liance upon his job relationship with the employer as the basis of his
livelihood.
Apparently such were the convictions of the draftsmen of most of the
unemployment compensation laws, for they expressed a desire to ex-
tend the protection of those laws to persons who might not be deemed
employees under the legal concepts governing the liability of a master
for tortious acts of his servant. 21 The statutory definition of employ-
ment recommended by them, and incorporated in the draft unemploy-
ment compensation law prepared by the Social Security Board, -2 was
patterned after the existing Wisconsin statute 23 and is commonly
called the "ABC" definition. It was adopted by most of the states in
the following form:
"(1) Employment... means serice... performed for wages or
under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied....
20. The validity of this assumption is discussed elsewhere in this issue of the Joural.
See Arnold, Experience Rating, page 218 infra, at 220. Cf. Schmidt, -cpriencr Rating and
Unemployment Compensation, 218.
21. At the time when most unemployment compensation laws were in the drafting
stage (October 1936), the Committee on Legal Affairs of the Interstate Conference of Un-
employment Compensation Agencies unanimously agreed that the test of coverage 'should
not be confined to the technical legal relationship of master and servant." The Committee
gave as reasons the general purposes of such laws and the belief that restriction of coverage
to "the technical legal relationship of master and servant constitutes an obvious avenue of
evading coverage by creating different legal relationships, for example, an independent
contractor relationship." The Committee recommended that a definition of employment
similar to that contained in the Wisconsin unemployment compensation law be incorporated
in State laws "as the basis for extending their coverage beyond the master and s~ervant
relationship." Report of Committee, p. 2.
22. The draft bill first containing the "ABC" definition recommended by the Interstate
Conference was issued in January 1937.
23. The "ABC" definition was incorporated in the Wisconsin act by INis. Laws 1935,
c. 192, § 5. The Wisconsin Advisory Committee, a statutory body created to advise the
legislature in matters of unemployment legislation (among other functions) described the
statutory definition which it recommended to the 1935 legislature as providing a definition
which "is unique and exists only in the field of unemployment compensation and . . . is
to be considered apart from conceptions of employer-employee relationships existing in
other fields." Explanation of Changes, Bill No. 426, S., 1941 Legislature.
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"(5) Services performed by an individual for wages shall be
deemed to be employment subject to this act unless and until it is
sho~n to the satisfaction of commissioner that-
(a) such individual has been and will continue to be free
from control or direction over the performance of such
service, both under his contract of service and in fact;
and
(b) such service is either outside the usual course of the
business for which such service is performed or that
such service is performed outside of all the places of
business of the enterprise for which such service is per-
formed; and
(c) such individual is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession or business."
The laws of a few states contain the "ABC" definition with varia-
tions which either tend to broaden coverage 24 or restrict it in minor
degree. 25 In a number of states, the "ABC" definition has been so
modified as to restrict considerably its applicability," in some by the
specific provision that common-law principles of the master-servant
relationship shall govern. 2 The laws of seven states 21 do not contain
any of the three tests, but define employment as "service . . . per-
formed for wages, or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express
or implied," 29 or use terms such as "service . . . performed by an
employee," 30 "the relationship of employer and employee," 31 or
"contract of employment," 32 without further definition of those terms,
24. Oklahoma uses the conjunctive in the second test; Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Mary-
land, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon (which deletes the second test), Utah, and Washington
add to the third test the words "of the same natureas that involved in the contract of serv-
ice"; Maryland, North Dakota and Hawaii have inserted in the clause introducing the
three tests the words "irrespective of whether the common law relationship of master and
servant exists."
25. Kansas omits the third test; Virginia makes the second and third tests disjunctive;
Wisconsin's definition has been modified and now provides substantially the first and third
tests.
26. Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Texas include only the first test; South Dakota
makes the three tests disjinctive; Indiana omits the second test and adds to the third the
words "or is an agent receiving remuneration solely upon a commission basis, and who Is
the master of his own time and effort"; regarding Ohio, see note 91 infra.
27. Alabama, Arkansas (the statute also includes the three tests in the disjunctive),
Minnesota (which oddly makes this test an alternative to the three-test definition), and
Mississippi.
28. California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Michigan, and
New York.
29. California, District of Columbia, and Michigan (which substitutes "remunera-
tion" for "wages"). The Michigan law formerly contained the "ABC" test. See note 46
infra.
30. Colorado. This law at one time contained the "ABC" test. See note 37 infra.
31. Connecticut (prior to Oct. 1, 1943 the words "master and servant" were in place of




In all states, apart from the specificity of the "ABC" definition
where it is used, and despite its absence where it is not used, the drafts-
men could hope that the courts would look to the purposes of the legis-
lation and construe its provisions consistently vith its policy objec-
tives.13 Most of the state acts contain a declaration of policy like the
following:
"As a guide to the interpretation and application of this Act, the
public policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Economic in-
security due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health,
morals, and welfare of the people of this state resulting in a public
calamity. The Legislature, therefore, declares that in its consid-
'ered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citi-
zens of this state require the enactment of this measure, under the
police powers of the state, for compulsory setting aside of unem-
ployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed
through no fault of their omn."
The declaration emphasizes what would be evident even without it:
that the statute is remedial legislation with a broad purpose to avoid
economic insecurity. Thus, at whatever line the limits of the employ-
ment relationship might be drawn for various other purposes, with
respect to unemployment insurance the definitions of "employment"
should be interpreted with a view toward effectuating the underlying
policy of the legislation. Workers falling on either side of the line of
demarcation drawn for respondeat superior purposes may be within
the class exposed to the hazard against which the unemployment in-
surance legislation is intended to afford protection.3s
33. See Landis, Statutes and tw Sources of Law (1934) HrVAPD LEGAL EsSAvs 213.
The Restatement offers this word of caution: "Statutory use of 'serrant.' Statutes have been
passed in which the words 'servant' and 'agent' have been used. The meaning of theze words
in statutes varies. The context and purpose of the particular statute controls the meaning
which is frequently not that which the same word bears in the Restatement of this Sub-
ject." RESTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933) § 220, comment (1)d.
34. Missouri Unemployment Compensation Act § 2, 20 Mo. Ruv. STAT. AN.. (1943)
§ 9422.
35. In Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 Fed. 547, 552 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914),
cert. denied, 235 U. S. 705 (1915), involving workmen's compensation coverage, Judge Hand
said: "It is true that the statute uses the word 'employed,' but it must be understood with
reference to the purpose of the act, and where all the conditions of the relation require pro-
tection, protection ought to be given . . . . Such statutes are partial; they upZet the free-
dom of contract, and for ulterior purposes put the two contesting sides at unequal advan-
tage; they should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the
purposes which lie behind them." To similar effect see International Stevedoring Co. v.
Haverty, 272 U. S. 50 (1926); Warner v. Goltra, 293 U. S. 155 (1934); Fox v. Standard Oil
Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1935); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns Inc., 310 U. S. 534
(1940); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944).
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES USING "ABC" DEFINITION
Content of the "ABC" Definition.
The reader will note first that the "ABC" definition does not contain
any of the words with common-law connotations-"master," "serv-
ant," "employee," or "independent contractor." The draftsmen might
have used such and relied hopefully upon the general recognition that
terms may have a meaning varying from their common-law meaning
when used in remedial legislation. But in the unemployment compen-
sation laws adopting the three-test definition, not only were those
terms not contained in the definition, but there was an obviously studied
effort to avoid such connotations by not using such terms anywhere
in the acts. The wage earner is referred to ordinarily as an "indi-
vidual." An employer's liability for payment of contributions into the
unemployment compensation fund is based upon the payment by him
of "wages" for "employment." Entitlement of a claimant for benefits
is based upon the amount of "wages" he has been paid for "employ-
ment." "..Wages" is defined broadly as remuneration for services.
Thus, both the question of contribution liability and of benefit entitle-
ment depend upon whether the services are performed in "employ-
ment," which is the subject of a single statutory definition.
Unlike the Restatement, which stresses the process under the com-
mon law of weighing the nine listed factors to determine whether or
not there is a sufficient group of favorable factors to establish the
master-servant relationship, the statutory definition includes in "em-
ployment" all services performed for wages unless and until it is shown
to the satisfaction of the administrative agency that each of three posi-
tive tests is met. Each test is separate, has a distinct significance, and
exists on a co6rdinate basis with each of the other two. Thus, positive
legislative standards are substituted for factors of varying and uncer-
tain weight."a
The "A" Test. The first test, that the "individual has been and will
continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of
his services both under his contract of service and in fact" appears
different in certain respects from Restatement factor (1), "the extent
of the control which by the agreement the master may exercise over
the details of the work." To meet this statutory test it must appear
that the contract does not confer upon the principal any right of con-
36. Certain of the factors described in the Restatement are not touched on by the
statutory definition: the kind of occupation and the customs of the locality with respect to
it; the skill required in the particular occupation; who furnishes the tools; the length of
time for which the person is employed; the method of payment, by time or by the job;
whether the parties believe they are creating the master-servant relationship. Although
some of the substance of the remaining factors of the Restatement is reflected in some meas-
ure in the statutory criteria, they serve merely as part of the raw material out of which the
statutory definition was constructed.
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trol or direction over the performance of such services, and that he has
not exercised and will not exercise such control or direction in fact.
The possibility of control in the future would thus seem to be as de-
cisive as present control. It is not wholly clear what freedom from
control "over the performance of services" means, but the omission of
any reference to physical performance or to manner and means of
work indicates that freedom from common-law control alone would
not satisfy the test. It would seem that the existence or possibility of a
"general control" as known in some of the common-law cases would
still leave the test unsatisfied.
The "B" Test. The second test which must be met to establish the
absence of the employment relationship requires that the service in
question be "outside the usual course of the business for which such
service is performed," or "performed outside of all the places of busi-
ness of the enterprise for which such service is performed." The first
alternative is satisfied only if the activity is not part of the business of
the principal. This alternative would not be satisfied by the fact that
the person engaged to perform the services does so pursuant to his own
independently established business; the service must be out of the usual
course of the principal's business. While the first alternative is con-
cerned with whose business is being carried on, the second alternative
seems to be concerned with where it is being carried on.
The "C" Test. The third test, requiring a showing that "such indi-
vidual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession or business," appears to be at once the most
radical departure from common-law criteria and the most relevant of
the three tests to the purposes of the unemployment compensation
program. In determining the point between the clearly servant status
and the self-employed class at which the line of coverage for unemploy-
ment insurance is to be drawn, it seems most appropriate to distin-
guish between the person who pursues an established business of his
own, who is not ordinarily dependent upon a particular business rela-
tionship with another for his economic survival, and other persons who
are dependent upon the continuance of their relationship with a prin-
cipal for their economic livelihood. Under the statutory definition the
words "independently established" depart from the technical "inde-
pendence" of the common-law independent contractor and seem to
require that the individual performing services be engaged in a trade,
occupation, profession, or business which is established independently
of the particular connection he may have from time to time with cer-
tain principals. The words "czustonzarily engaged" would seem to
require that he customarily hold himself in readiness to render services
in the course of such trade, occupation, profession, or business to indi-
viduals desiring to engage him, and would appear not to be satisfied
where the trade, occupation, profession, or business exists only in a
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particular relationship with a principal and would vanish when that
connection terminates.
The "C" test, in summary, seems to draw the line of demarcation on
an economic basis, so as to include within the Act those who perform
services for an entrepreneur and who are not themselves acting as
entrepreneurs in that connection in the pursuit of an independently
established business, trade, or profession. Moreover, being essentially
a test of economic status and existing independently of the "A" test
relating to control, the "C" test precludes the "manipulation" of the
employment relationship which the control test makes possible for
employers, who may so draw the contract of employment and so ar-
range their methods of supervision that an appearance of freedom
from control is created.
Majority View: "ABC" Definition Given Full Application.
One of the first cases testing the scope of the "ABC" definition was
Industrial Commission v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany,"7 involving the coverage of commission life insurance salesmen.
In its analysis of the definition, the Colorado Supreme Court con-
cluded:
"When defining or referring to 'wages,' 'employment,' 'em-
ployer' and 'benefits' in the act the legislature deliberately avoids
the use of the word 'employee,' and uses the much broader term,
'individual.' That this indicates legislative intent as to who is
covered, cannot be doubted. The terms 'independent contractor'
or 'master and servant' nowhere appear. The act prescribes the
statutory test . . . and we must not be led astray by any other
criterion ...
". .. Here the statutory definition of 'employment' is broad
and inclusive, and it cannot be so construed as to limit the meaning
to the relationship of master and servant without violating the leg-
islative intent.-8
"This statutory definition sets forth three conditions, and they
are in the conjunctive. A showing of conformity with all three, to
the satisfaction of the commission, is a prerequisite to exemption
from coverage under the law." 11
That case was soon followed by the decision of the North Carolina
Supreme Court in a case which also involved coverage of commission
37. 103 Colo. 550, 88 P. (2d) 560.(1939).
38. Id. at 555-6, 88 P. (2d) at 563.
39. Id. at 554, 88 P. (2d) at 562. Followed in Equitable Life Ins, Co. v. Industrial
Comm., 105 Colo. 144, 95 P. (2d) 4 (1939); Brannaman v. International Service Union
Ass'n, 108 Colo. 409, 118 P. (2d) 457 (1941). The statute was subsequently amended to
eliminate the "ABC" definition.
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life insurance salesmen. Commenting that the terms in the act "are
not used as words of art having rigid, precise and restricted meanings,
but rather . ..as broad terms of description, evidencing a legislative
intent to give to the Act a broad and liberal coverage to the end that
the far-reaching effects of unemployment may be alleviated," the court
observed:
"The scope and purpose of the present act are exceptional in
breadth. The draftsmanship of the definition section, which gives
flesh and sinew to the whole, shows a carefully considered and de-
liberate purpose to leap many legal barriers which would halt less
ambitious enactments. As far as language will permit it, the act
evinces a studied effort to sweep beyond and to include, by redefini-
tion, many individuals who would have been otherwise excluded
from the benefits of the act by the former concepts of master and
servant and principal and agent as recognized at common law." 4
Similar conclusions were reached by the courts of the following states
in which the "ABC" provisions substantially as quoted above were
40. Unemployment Comp. Comm. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 215 N. C. 479.
486, 2 S. E. (2d) 584, 589 (1939). See also North Carolina v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 219 N. C.
S76, 14 S. E. (2d) 6S9 (1940).
The Utah Supreme Court analyzed in more detail the Eetting of the definitioa in the
scheme of the statute:
"... . it seems clear to us that the legislature has endeavored to define by the
Act itself a classification of individuals entitled to employment benefits. Hence,
the statutory definition, rather than any common law concepts, if differing there-
from, govern-in so far as they are applicable. The fact that neither the term 'em-
ployee' nor the term 'independent contractor' is used anywhere in the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act is itself indicative that the legislature did not intend to ue
the relationships of 'independent contractor' or 'employer-employee,' as defined by
the common law, as the criteria to determine who are entitled to benefits under the
Unemployment Compensation Act. The word 'individual' is used throughout the
Act to refer to the person seeking unemployment benefits. While the terms 'em-
ployer' and 'employing unit' are used, they are specifically defined by the Act so
that they have a distinct meaning which may or may not coincide with the ordinary
conception of 'employer.' "
Creameries of America v. Industrial Comm., 98 Utah 571, 576, 102 P. (2d) 300, 302 (1940);
Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm., 98 Utah 36, 91 P. (2d) 512 (1939). drcisio
amended on motion for reb'g, 98 Utah 48, 97 P. (2d) 582 (1939). See also Salt Lake Tribune
Pub. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 99 Utah 259, 102 P. (2d) 307 (1940); National Tunnel &
Mines Co. v. Industrial Comrm, 99 Utah 39, 102 P. (2d) 503 (1940); Combined Metals Rc-
duction Co. v. Industrial Comm., 101 Utah 230, 116 P. (2d) 929 (1941); Singer Se.vng
Machine Co. v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah 175, 134 P. (2d) 479 (1943), off'd on reh'g,
104 Utah 196, 141 P. (2d) 694 (1943); Northern Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah 353,
140 P. (2d) 329 (1943); Utah Hotel Co. v. Utah Industrial Comm., 151 P. (2d) 467 (Utah
Sup. Ct. 1944).
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adopted: Arizona, 41 Arkansas,4 2 Georgia, 4 Illinois,44 Indiana, 45 Michi-
41. Sisk v. Arizona Ice & Cold Storage Co., 60 Ariz. 496, 500, 141 P. (2d) 395, 396
(1943), the court stating: "The framers of this legislation evidently were familiar with the
laws in the field occupied by the laboring man and the problems pertaining thereto ....
It quite clearly appears that the relationship need not be that of master and servant or
employer and employee or principal and agent." See also Gaskin v. Wayland, 61 Ariz. 291,
148 P. (2d) 590 (1944).
42. McKinley v. Payne and Son Lumber Co., 200 Ark. 1114, 1118, 143 S. W. (2d) 38,
40 (1940): ". . . whether he [lumber stacker] would be classed as an independent contractor
under the common law, we think, is immaterial because under the Unemployment Compen-
sation Act he was an employee." However, after the Arkansas law was amended to apply
"only where the legal relationship of master and servant exists," the court in a case involv-
ing application of the prior law concluded that although the "ABC" tests were not met the
alleged employees did not receive remuneration for personal services. McCain v. Crossett
Lumber Co., 206 Ark. 51, 174 S. W. (2d) 114 (1943).
43. Young v. Bureau of Unemployment Comp., 63 Ga. App. 130, 10 S. E. (2d) 412
(1940). In Huiet v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 66 Ga. App. 602, 18 S. E. (2d) 693
(1942) the Court of Appeals held that before the "ABC" test is applied a service relationship
must be found to exist, which depends upon whether control is exercised by the principal.
See discussion of Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Comm., pages 95-8 infra. Subsequent deci-
sions of the Georgia Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, however, have not adhered
to that view. Zachos v. Huiet, 195 Ga. 780, 25 S. E. (2d) 806 (1943); Royal Cigar Co. v.
Huiet, 195 Ga. 852, 25 S. E. (2d) 810 (1943); Johnson v. Huiet, 67 Ga. App. 638, 21 S. E.
(2d) 437 (1942); Babb & Nolan v. Huiet, 67 Ga. App. 861, 21 S. E. (2d) 663 (1942); Brewster
v. Huiet, 69 Ga. App. 593, 26 S. E. (2d) 198 (1943); Union Dry Goods Co. v. Cook, 71 Ga.
App. 708, 32 S. E. (2d) 190 (1944).
44. A. George Miller, Inc. v. Murphy, 379 III. 524,42 N. E. (2d) 78 (1942); Rozran v.
Durkin, 381 Ill. 97, 45 N. E. (2d) 180 (1942); Peasley v. Murphy, 381 Ill. 187, 44 N. E.
(2d) 876 (1942) (in which the court held the statutory definition sufficiently comprehensive
to include all workers to whose security unemployment is a threat). Two decisions in 1943,
Ozark Minerals Co. v. Murphy, 384 Ill. 94, 51 N. E. (2d) 197 (1943), and Toplis and Hard-
ing, Inc. v. Murphy, 384 Ill. 463, 51 N. E. (2d) 505 (1943), temporarily confused the situa-
tion in the interpretation of other provisions of the law designed to determine who is the
employer rather than whether a person is in employment. The situation was subsequently
clarified in decisions in which the contrast between the broad statutory definition and the
narrow common law criterion was again emphasized. Murphy v. Daumit, 387 111. 406,
56 N. E. (2d) 800 (1944); Zelney v. Murphy, 387 I11. 492, 56 N. E. (2d) 754 (1944); N. Y.
Life Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 388 Ill. 316, 58 N. E. (2d) 182 (1944) (which clearly restricted the
scope of the Ozark Minerals and Toplis and Harding decisions); Arrow Petroleum Co. v.
Murphy, 389 Ii. 43, 58 N. E. (2d) 532 (1944); John Gabel Mfg. Co. v. Murphy, 62 N. E.
(2d) 401 (Ill. 1945); Photographic Illustrations, Inc. v. Murphy, 59 N. E. (2d) 681 (11.
1945); Van Ogden, Inc. v. Murphy, 60 N. E. (2d) 877 (Il1. 1945). See In re Mid America
Co., 31 F. Supp. 601 (S. D. Ill. 1939) in which the court interpreted the Illinois Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act to the same effect. Cf. Beth Weber, Inc. v. Murphy, 58 N. E. (2d)
913 (I11. 1945).
45. Park Improvement Co. v. Review Bd., 109 Ind. App. 538,36 N. E. (2d) 985 (1941);
Review Bd. v. Mammoth Life and Accident Ins. Co. 111 Ind. App. 660, 42 N. E. (2d) 379




gan, 46 New Jersey 4 1 Oregon,4 Utah,4 Virginia,"9 Washington, 51 Wis-
consin. 52
The decisions in these states have not very clearly developed the
content of the first test. By and large, the courts have not seemed to
give the first test a very different meaning than they would have the
common-law control test. The Colorado, Illinois, and Washington
courts, however, have stated that this test is not concerned with
"details" of control but with "general control"; -3 but how much less
46. In Bert Baker, Inc. v. Ryce, 301 Mich. 84, 3 N. WV. (2d) 20 (1942), the Supreme
Court quoted only the "A" test of the definition and proceeded to hold a lessee car mechanic
an independent contractor because the common law test was not satisfied, without mention
or application of the remaining two tests. However, in Acme Messenger Service Co. v.
Unemployment Comp. Comm., 306 Mich. 704, 11 N. IV. (2d) 196 (1943), the court held the
prexious decision inapplicable, gave full scope to the statutory definition, and held przons
delivering packages and messages for a messenger company to be in employment. SubZ-
quently in O'Brian v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 309 'Mich. 13, 14 N. IV. (2d) 560
(1944), involving coverage of appliers of roofing and siding, the court reiterated the view,
expressed in the Acme case, that the statute furnishes its own test of the employment rela-
tionship. In 1943 the statute was amended by the deletion of the "ABC" test. Mich. Lawa
1943, Act 246.
47. Schomp v. Fuller Brush Co., 124 N. J. L. 487, 12 A. (2d) 702 (1940); Steel Pier
Amusement Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 127 N. J. L. 154, 21 A. (2d) 767 (1941);
Superior Life, Health and Accident Ins. Co. v. Board of Rev., 127 N. J. L. 537, 23 A. (2d)
806 (1942); Electrolux Corp. v. Board of Rev., 129 N. J. L. 134, 28 A. (2d) 207 (1942).
48. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. State Unemployment Comp. Comm., 167 Ore. 142,
103 P. (2d) 708 (1940), aff'd on reb'g, 167 Ore. 153, 116 P. (2d) 744 (1941); Rahoutis v. Un-
employment Comp. Comm., 171 Ore. 93. 136 P. (2d) 426 (1943); Journal Publishing Co. v.
State Unemployment Comp. Comm., 155 P. (2d) 570 (Ore. Sup. Ct. 1945).
49. See note 40 supra.
50. Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 173 Va. 46, 16 S. E.
(2d) 357 (1941); Unemployment Comp. Comm., v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202, 18 S. E. (2d) 390
(1942); Unemployment Comp. Comm. v. Collins, 182 Va. 426. 29 S. E. (2d) 383 (1944).
51. McDermott v. State, 196 Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d) 563 (1933), in which Department
One of the court held the statutory definition broader than the common law master and
servant relation, was in that respect not followed by Department Two in Washington Re-
corder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718 (1939), discuszed irsfra. The Mc-
Dermott case viev, however, was followed by subsequent decisions in Matter of Farwezt
Taxi Service, Inc., 9 Wash. (2d) 134, 115 P. (2d) 164 (1941); Mulhausen v. Bates, 9 Wash.
(2d) 264, 114 P. (2d) 995 (1941); Matter of Foy, 10 Wash. (2d) 317, 116 P. (2d) 545 (1941);
Sound Cities Gas & Oil Co., Inc. v. Ryan, 13 Wash. (2d) 457, 125 P. (2d) 246 (1942); Statev.
Goessman, 13 Wash. (2d) 598, 126 P. (2d) 201 (1942); Matter of Employees of Hillman
Investment Co., 15 Wash. (2d) 452, 131 P. (2d) 160 (1942); Unemployment Comp Dep't v.
Hunt, 17 Wash. (2d) 228, 135 P. (2d) S9 (1943).
52. Ioorman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 241 Wis. 200, 5 N. W. (2d) 743 (1942),
clarifying the earlier decision in Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm., 233 Wis
467, 290 N. Wk. 199 (1940); Maloney v. Industrial Comm., 242 Wis. 165, 9 N. IV. (2d) 623
(1943). For critical analysis of Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. case Eee note [19411 Wis. L.
REv. 269.
53. Industrial Comm. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550, 33 P.
(2d) 560 (1939); Murphy v. Daumit, 387 III. 406, 56 N. E. (2d) 800 (1944); Sound Cities
Gas & Oil Co.. Inc. v. Ry-an, 13 Wash. (2d) 457, 125 P. (2d) 246 (1942).
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control over "details" or "physical performance" of services would
still be considered "general control" remains unclear. Neither of the
alternatives of the second test, relating to whether the services are
performed outside the usual course of the principal's business or out-
side all of his places of business, has received very great discussion.
In a recent decision of the Utah court, however, the decision of the
administrative agency under review, that a "name" dance band and
"specialty entertainers" engaged by a hotel were in "employment,"
was based solely on a finding that the second test was not met. 4 The
court held that neither alternative was satisfied, since it was usual
and customary for the hotel to furnish such entertainment and since
the services were performed in the hotel company's place of business.
A number of courts have held that the place at which a salesman col-
lects insurance "debits" or makes sales calls is the place of business of
the principal."
- The third test has been given very great significance by most of the
courts which have recognized the departure of the statutory definition
from the common-law test. It has been held that to meet the test it is
necessary to show that the person performing services is established in
the business of performing like services independent of whatever connec-
tion he may have with the principal 16 and that he must have a proprie-
tary interest in such business, something in which he has a right of
continuity, which he can sell or give away, and which is not subject to
cancellation or destruction upon severance of the relationship with the
principal."
54. Utah Hotel Co. v. Utah Industrial Comm., 151 P. (2d) 467 (Utah 1944).
55. Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 178 Va. 46, 16 S. E.
(2d) 357 (1941); Superior Life, Health and Accident Ins. Co. v. Board of Rev., 127 N. J. L.
537, 23 A. (2d) 806 (1942); Unemployment Comp. Comm. v. Collins, 182 Va. 426, 29 S, E.
(2d) 388 (1944); Babb & Nolan v. Huiet, 67 Ga. App. 861, 21 S. E. (2d) 663 (1942). This
view was criticized in Washington Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P.
(2d) 718 (1939). In Northern Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah 353, 140 P. (2d) 329
(1943), the Utah court seems to have correctly applied this alternative, holding that tile
places at which the salesmen solicited sales of securities were not places of business of the
principal, but that the alternative remained unsatisfied because the sales were consummated
at the principal's offices to which the salesmen brought customers. See John Gabel Mfg.
Co. v. Murphy, 62 N. E. (2d) 401 (I11. 945), in which the Illinois court held persons servic-
ing "juke boxes" performed such services at the principal's place of business, since the prin-
cipal and the owner of the premises at which the machine was placed shared collections.
-. 56. Industrial Comm. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P. (2d)
560 (1939).
57. Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 178 Va. 46, 16 S. E.
(2d) 357 (1941). See also Unemployment Comp. Comm. v. Collins, 182 Va. 426, 29 5. E.
(2d) 388 (1944); Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Comm., 99 Utah 97, 104 P. (2d) 201 (1940);
Murphy v. Daumit, 387 I1. 406, 56 N. E. (2d) 800 (1944). The fact that the alleged em-
ployee has other independent activities has been held immaterial, if with respect to the
services in question he does not conduct an independent business. Northern Oil Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 104 Utah 353, 140 P. (2d) 329 (1943). Some state statutes specifically
so provide. See note 24 supra.
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Minority View: "ABC" Definition Not Given Full Application.
In a few states the courts have not given full scope to the "ABC"
definition, either by holding that the definition itself does not extdnd
coverage beyond the common-law master-servant relationship, or, to
the same result, by applying the definition only to determine whether
relationships which have been held to be common-law master-servant
relationships shall nevertheless be excluded from coverage.
The former view, as to the "A" and "C" tests, was first expressed in
1939 by Department Two of the Washington Supreme Court in Wash-
ington Recorder Publishing Company v. Ernst.-3 The case involved the
coverage of newspaper carriers, operating under the "Little Merchant
Plan," which is in widespread use throughout the nation, whereby the
carrier agrees to abide by rules prescribed by the publisher, to deliver
promptly and regularly each day to designated subscribers, to collect
from subscribers on a specified day at an established rate, to keep
correct subscription lists on prescribed forms, to deliver free any com-
plimentary copies, and not to handle any other newspaper. The differ-
ence between the subscriber price and the price charged the carrier by
the publisher constitutes "compensation for delivery and collection."
Department Two of the Supreme Court, in a decision affirming the
lower court which had reversed a determination of the administrative
agency that the services were in employment, first observed that at
the time of the adoption of the state unemployment compensation
statute the weight of authority was to the effect that carriers operating
under similar contracts were independent contractors.0 Turning to
the first and third tests of the statutory "employment definition," C)
the court held that they
". .. do not differ from the test employed at the common law
and by this court in determination of the question whether the rela-
tionship is that of employee or independent contractor. In the Re-
statement of the Law of Agency, nine different items are recited as
the principal elements to be considered in determining which rela-
tionship [employee or independent contractor] exists. In the enact-
s8. 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718 (1939).
59. As to the cases cited for this proposition, in Bohanon v. McClatchy Pub. Co., 16
Cal. App. (2d) 188, 60 P. (2d) 510 (1936); Batt v. San Diego Sun Pub. Co., 21 Cal. App.
(2d) 429, 69 P. (2d) 216 (1937); and Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm.,
191 Cal. 404, 216 Pac. 578 (1923), the California courts required "entire," "complete,"
or "unqualified" control by the principal, which was a more strict common law test than
had theretofore been applied by the Washington court; the narrow test of the common law
relationship applied in the remaining case, Gall v. Detroit Journal Co., 191 Mich. 405,
158 N. W. 36 (1916), had been expressly rejected in an earlier Washington decision, Dishman
v. Whitney, 121 Wash. 157, 209 Pac. 12 (1922). See note 63 infra.
60. The third test of the statute was stronger than the third test generally used, in that
it required that the independently established business must be "of the Eame nature as that
involved in the contract of service."
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ment of the unemployment compensation statute, the legislature
. . . picked out three elements to be considered. The legislature
did not say, nor is the language capable of that interpretation, that
each of those elements must exist one hundred per cent in order to
establish the relationship of independent contractor. Surely, the
legislature did not intend to establish a different rule than that
which has heretofore been employed by this court. To hold other-
wise, would be to, in effect, eliminate the relationship of independ-
ent contractor. It would be a violent presumption indeed to hold
that that was the purpose of the legislature." 61
The court proceeded to analyze the "A" and "C" tests in terms of tort
law. It reasoned, without apparent regard for the independent signifi-
cance given each of the three tests in the statute, that since at common
law the control test governed, the "C" test of the statute must be
considered a corollary of the "A" test, and thus, in effect, that where
i one is not subject to control under common-law criteria the "C" test
is satisfied.62
61. Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 186-7, 91 P. (2d) 718,
724 (1939). In view of the clear provision of the statute that all services "shall be deemed to
be employment subject to this Act unless and until it is shown," that all three of the pre-
scribed tests are met, it is difficult indeed to understand the court's statement that the legis-
lature did not say, and that the statute is not capable of the interpretation, that each of the
tests must be wholly met. Nor does it seem inexplicable that the legislature may have
intended to eliminate for the purposes of unemployment compensation coverage the fine
distinctions involved in applying the independent contractor concept in tort law. At the
time of this decision two courts had held that such was the obvious intention of their re-
spective legislatures, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Unemployment Comp. Comm.
v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 215 N. C. 479, 2 S. E. (2d) 584 (1939), and the Colorado
Supreme Court in Industrial Comm. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550,
88 P. (2d) 560 (1939). The suggestion by the court that to permit coverage for unemploy-
ment compensation purposes of persons who may be "independent contractors" at common
law would eliminate the relationship of independent contractor is clearly specious. The
statute is applicable only to determining coverage for unemployment compenwtion purposes.
62. It is difficult to understand how the carriers could be considered to be "customarily
engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business of tile
same nature as that involved in the contract of service," in view of the fact that they were
not established and customarily engaged in the business of sale and distribution of news-
papers independently of their connection with the publisher, that the arrangement forbade
them from performing similar activities for any other publisher, and that they did not hold
themselves out as engaged in an enterprise of their own which would survive termination of
their relationship with this particular publisher. A dissenting judge pointed out that in an
earlier unemployment compensation case, McDermott v. State, 196 Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d)
568 (1938), which was nowhere discussed on this point in the court's opinion, the court
(Department One) had held the statutory definition was not an embodiment of common-
law tests. He concluded that it was the obvious intention of the legislature "to prevent the
evasions which could arise from the refined distinctions which so often attend those common-
law concepts," and quoted without comment the following from the opinion of the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Unemployment Comp. Comm. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins,
Co., 215 N. C. 479, 2 S. E. (2d) 584 (1939) interpreting the "ABC" definition:
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Although the TVashington Recorder decision was in effect over-
ruled,63 it caused considerable difficulty in other states in sustaining
the statutory definition in full vigor, and its reasoning was in fact
followed by some courts.
Soon thereafter the effectiveness of the "ABC" definition was
threatened by the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Fuller Brzsh
Company v. Industrial Commission.6 " The case involved the coverage
of so-called "dealers" of the Fuller Brush Company who were assigned
specific territories, were supplied with sample brushes, and "purchased"
goods from the company for cash or credit which they resold to pur-
chasers by house-to-house canvassing at an advanced price suggested
by the company. Unsold brushes could be returned to the company.
The common attributes of a sales organization were present: a repre-
sentative of the company in charge of sales in that district hired and
"The power of the General Assembly to broaden or restrict common law con-
cepts is widely recognized [citations] and is not here challenged. Although the ex-
tent of the area encompassed by some of the definition may cause surprise, the duty
of this court is to expound and to interpret the law as it is given to us, not to re-draft
it along lines which may seem to us more conservative and more desirable. The
economic and social evil of unemployment in its broad sweep frequently disregards
man-made geographic and political boundaries; perhaps, it follows that former
boundaries must be surrendered in seeking a remedy for such an evil. If new sEocial
evils produce, as counter-forces, new ideas of control of these evils, and such ideas
are brought to us from the legislative forum, we must guard against falling victims
to that suspicion which is born of the mere novelty of things."
Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 197-S, 91 P. (2d) 713, 728 (1939).
It is interesting to note that the Washington court in Wilson v. Times Printing Co., ISS
Wash. 95, 290 Pac. 691 (1930), involving substantially the same facts, had affirmed the
judgment of the lower court which held the publisher liable for injuries caued a third perzon
by the negligence of its newspaper carrier. Yet in the instant case the court held that as a
matter of law the carriers were independent contractors.
63. See cases cited supra note 51. The conflict between Departments One and Two of
the Court, reflected in the McDernwti and Washington Recorder cases, was re-olved by the
court en bane in Matter of Foy, 10 Wash. (2d) 317, 116 P. (2d) 545 (1941). In the Sound
Cities Gas & Oil Co., Inc. v. Ryan, 13 Wash. (2d) 457, 464-5, 125 P. (2d) 246, 249 (1942) the
court en banw said:
"The opinions of this court, just cited, with the exception of ,ashino rln Re-
corder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, supra, commit this court to the vew that our unemploy-
ment compensation act, which is similar to those of the majority of the states v;hcre
this form of social security obtains, does not confine taxable employment to the
relation of master and servant. If the common law relationship of master and Eerv-
ant was to obtain, the legislature would have so stated."
Relationships with newspaper carriers substantially similar to that in issue in the IH'ashing-
ton Recorder case were subsequently held within the "ABC" definition in Salt Lake Tribune
Pub. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 99 Utah 259, 102 P. (2d) 307 (1940), and in Journal Pub. Co.
v. State Unemployment Comp. Comm., 155 P. (2d) 570 (Ore. Sup. Ct. 1945). See alzo
Matter of Scatola, 282 N. Y. 6S9, 26 N. E. (2d) 815 (1940), and California Employment
Comm. v. Los Angeles Downatovn Shopping News Corp., 24 Cal. (2d) 421, 150 P. (2d) 186
(1944), each involving application of common-law criteria
64. 99 Utah 97, 104 P. (2d) 201 (1940).
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gave advice to dealers on the conduct of their sales activities, and "re-
quested" progress reports from them; a sales manual suggesting the
method of canvassing was provided and sales meetings were held daily;
prizes and premiums were given for a good sales record; and a sales
force bulletin was published by the company. The relationship was
terminable at will.
The court observed that clause (1) of the definition of "employment"
defines that word as "service .. .performed for wages or under any
contract of hire," and concluded that a personal service relationship
must be found to exist under clause (1), before it is inquired whether
the relationship meets the "ABC" tests in clause (5) and is thereby
excluded from "employment." Whether a personal service relation-
ship exists depends, continued the court, on the following criterion:
". .. services are performed for another when performed under
his supervision, direction and control, in the performance of the de-
tails of the work and in the use of the means employed; (Texas Co,
v. Wheeless, 185 Miss. 799, 187 So. 880), when he has the right to
hire (select the worker) and the right to fire (terminate the employ-
ment) and when the compensation, if any, accruing to the worker
becomes a direct liability on the other party. But all of these are
not always present, and if present they may not be evident on a
casual examination." 65
Even if a particular relationship constitutes a personal service rela-
tionship, the court added, it is not "employment" unless it is for
"wages," which is defined as "remuneration for personal services."
The court held that the dealers did not perform personal services for
the company because they were not subject to control and direction
by the company," although it seemed to concede that if a personal serv-
ice relationship had existed, the "C" exclusionary test would not have
been met inasmuch as the dealers were not customarily engaged in an
independently established business. Nor were the services rendered for
wages, the court concluded, because the dealer received his remunera-
tion not from the company but in the difference between the price
charged him by the company and the price he collected from the cus-
tomer.
In effect, while making no reference in this connection to the com-
mon-law master-servant relationship eo nomine, the court seems to
have held as follows: Employment means all services for wages, i.e.,
65. Id. at 103, 104 P. (2d) at 203. The Mississippi case cited by the court involved
unemployment compensation coverage under a statute which contains the words "em-
ployer" and "employee" without providing any statutory definition, as does the Utah
statute, of the employment relationship.
66. The administrative tribunal had found that a service relationship existed, that




remuneration for personal services, unless the "ABC" tests are met.
Before the "ABC" tests are applied it must be found that there is a
service relationship between the parties. A service relationship exists
only where the relationship would constitute the master-servant rela-
tionship at common law, which is conceived in terms of the master's
right to control the physical performance of services.
This rationale, as the Utah court later recognized, does violence to
the statutory definition. It seems quite proper to consider clause (1)
to require that a service relationship exist before inquiry is directed to
whether under clause (5) such service relationship is nevertheless ex-
cluded from "employment." But it is another matter to hold that
"service relationship" means common-law master-servant relationship
and, therefore, that the "ABC" tests are to be applied only to exclude
from coverage services which have already been found to meet the
test of the master-servant relationship. It would seem that a common-
law master-servant relationship could not meet the three statutory
tests, which the court elsewhere agreed are clearly broader than the
common law,67 and perhaps not any one of them. If the decision were
followed, clause (5) containing the "ABC" tests would never come
into play.',
The distortion of the statute by the rationale of the Utah Fuller
Brush case was very well described by the Oregon Supreme Court in
Singer Sewing Mllachine Company v. Unemployment Compensation Com-
mission, in which the court refused to follow the position of the Utah
court:
"[To hold] that the relation of master and servant must first be
shown before services performed by an individual for remuneration
shall be deemed to be employment subject to the unemployment
compensation act ...interpolates a clause which is not in the
statute, namely: where the common law, relationship of master and
servant is shown to exist. . . .The writer thinks that if the Ore-
gon legislature had deemed the common la, relationship of master
67. See note 40 supra.
68. There was a vigorous and cogent dissent by justice Wolfe, Fuller Brush Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 99 Utah 97, 107, 104 P. (2d) 201, 205 (1940). The decision was in clear
conflict with prior decisions of the came court; see cases cited supra note 40; in Creameries
of America v. Industrial Comm., 9S Utah 571, 580, 583, 102 P. (2d) 300, 304, 305 (1940)
the court had expressly rejected the contention that the master-servant relationchip must
exist before the "ABC" test becomes applicable, had interpreted the service relationship as
including "generally any act performed for the benefit of another under some arrangement
or agreement whereby such act was to have been performed," and had emphacized that the
way "service" is used in the Act "indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to
use the term in its broad general sense." Cf. Schomp v. Fuller Brush Co., 124 N. J. L. 437,
12 A. (2d) 702 (1940), involving the came relationship, in which the New Jersey court gave
full application to the "ABC" definition, and moreover found such a comprehensive control
exercised over the "dealers" as to indicate that a common-law master-zrvant relationship
existed.
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and servant an essential prerequisite to a participation in the pro-
tection and benefits of the act in question that honorable body
would have plainly said so as many other legislative bodies have." 11
The Utah court in a subsequent case 70 stated that it had not really
meant what it had seemed to say, and in novel fashion allayed any
misunderstanding by quoting and rewriting the troublesome portions
of its Fuller Brush opinion. The court held specifically that the "ABC"
definition does extend coverage beyond the common-law master-
servant relationship, and that a service relationship may exist even
where the principal does not have a right to control the physical per-
formance of services. But, just as the Washington Recorder case was
followed by other courts in achieving restrictive interpretations of the
"ABC" definition which persisted after the Washington court had in
effect overruled that case, so too the Fuller Brush case was used to the
same end,71 even after it had been rewritten.7 2
The decisions in other states which do not give full application to the
statutory definition follow the pattern of the Washington Recorder
case, the Fuller Brush case, or a combination of both. The Nebraska
court in Hill Hotel Company v. Kinney 11 considered the argument
plausible that "the legislature had power to change the common law
adopted in this state and make legislative definitions applicable to new
69. 167 Ore. 158, 163-4, 116 P. (2d) 744, 746 (1941), aff'g on reh'g, 167 Ore. 142, 103 P.
(2d) 708 (1940).
l70. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah 175, 134 P. (2d) 479
(1942).
71. In A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 348 Mo. 147, 152 S. W.
(2d) 184 (1941) the Missouri court followed the Fuller Brush decision and construed the
"ABC" definition as the equivalent of the common-law relationship. The Utah court in
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah 175, 193, 134 P. (2d) 479, 487
(1943), aff'd on re'g, 104 Utah 196, 141 P. (2d) 694 (1943), observed that if the Missouri
court "interpreted the Fuller opinion to hold that we confined the Act to the master and
servant relationship, or therein made any pronouncements with respect to independent
contractors, it misconceived and misinterpreted that opinion."
72. Before leaving the Washington Recorder and Fuller Brush cases it should be noted
that in each decision the court characterized the relationship involved as a vendor-vendee
relationship; the Utah court considered such a relationship to preclude existence of a serv-
ice relationship. This question was recently discussed at length in Journal Pub. Co. v.
State Unemployment Comp. Comm., 155 P. (2d) 570 (Ore. 1945), in which the Oregon
court obsdrved that although the passage of the goods (newspapers in that case) between
the parties was in the form of a sale, the important aspect of the matter is that the "vendee"
was obligated by contract to dispose of them in a certain manner, by daily sale and delivery
to a list of subscribers. The court characterized "service" essentially as aiding the principal
in the regular conduct of its business. By and large the courts have not had any difficulty
in piercing the characterization given a relationship by the parties-whether sale, lease,
consignment, etc.-where its real character is one of continuous activity in an integral part
of the principal's enterprise, without the economic freedom of action ordinarily accompany-
ing a true sale or lease.
73. 138 Neb. 760, 295 N. W. 397 (1940).
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enactments" and "that such power was exercised in the present in-
stance" but concluded that the reasoning of the W1ashingon Recorder
case was more sound.7 4 The court observed that the legislature had
adopted the common-law definition of independent contractor in the
workmen's compensation law, and that since in both that law and in
the unemployment compensation law "the lawmakers legislated on
labor problems .. . it should not be held without sound reasons that
they intended to vary the status of independent contractors under the
two intimately related statutes." T7 Therefore, the court folloved
common-law rules and did not undertake to apply the statutory defini-
tion to the fact situation before it.7G Similarly, in Uncmployment Com-
pensation Commission v. M1athews,n holding musicians not in "employ-
ment" of a hotel company, the Wyoming Supreme Court followed the
Washington Recorder case and concluded that the "ABC" definition
was but a restatement of the common law.75
The Florida Supreme Court, in a puzzling decision in Getile Bros.
Company v. Florida Industrial Commission, 70 did not expressly refer
at any point in its opinion to the three-test statutory provisions defin-
ing the employment relationship, but rather observed that the legisla-
ture did not express a positive intention to abrogate or enlarge upon
the common-law master and servant relationship, which was "well
recognized by our law and the courts of this State." 11 The court cited
the Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Company and WTashington Recorder cases
74. Id. at 764, 295 N. XW. at 399.
75. !id.
76. The decision is criticized in Note (1942) 21 NED. L. Prv. 64.
77. 56 Wyo. 479, 111 P. (2d) 111 (1941). Criticized in (1941) 90 U. of PA. L. RE. 229.
78. The court did however apply the statutory tests. In doing so, it is interesting to
note, it found that the services of the musicians were outside the usual courze of the hotel
company's business (the first alternative of the "B" test), although musicians had been
employed by the company for services of the kind in question for at least three years pre-
ceding the trial. For opposite result see Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 151 P. (2d)
467 (Utah 1944).
The scope of the statutory definition mas not clarified in a later decision, Tharp v.
Unemployment Comp. Comm., 57 Wyo. 4S6, 121 P. (2d) 172 (1942), holding barbers to a
employees on the basis of common law precedent.
The Nebraska and Wyoming courts have not been faced Equarely with the question of
the scope of the statutory definition since the modification of the lashington Rccordcr deci-
sion on which they so heavily relied. The uncertainty vhich they reflected in the Hill He!JU
and Mathews decisions suggests that they might express a different view in the future.
79. 151 Fla. 857, 10 So. (2d) 56S (1942).
SO. The court, apparently contemplating a novel sort of estoppel against the legLila-
ture, observed that "hundreds of thousands of dollars are paid out annually" by busine:Zas
of Florida on the basis of the common law independent contractor relationship.
The Florida law contains the common declaration of policy and alzo a provision (§ 443.20)
that the Act "shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose ...to provide through
the accumulation of reserves for the payment of compensation to individuals with rezlpct
to their unemployment."
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as authority that the statutory definitions were merely declaratory of
the common law; the Wisconsin case, however, had never stood for that
proposition 81 and the Washington Recorder case had been overruled as
far as that proposition was concerned, and these facts had been brought
-to the attention of the Florida court. Subsequently in Florida Indus-
trial Commission v. Peninsular Life Insurance Company,2 the court, in
discussing the three-test definition, concluded:
"Neither the history of the a-b-c-provisions nor the accepted
canons of construction support this contention ['that the a-b-c-pro-
visions ...supersede the common-law definition of employment'].
It appears that these provisions were first contained in the Wiscon-
sin Social Security Act and the Supreme Court of that state in Wis-
consin Bridge and Iron Co. v. Ramsey . . . .applied the common
law meaning to the words 'employee' and 'employer.' A great ma-
jority of the states have followed this interpretation and we think
the very terms of the Florida Act make it mandatory."
Again in this case the brief of the Industrial Commission had pointed
out that the Wisconsin court, in Moorman Manufacturing Company v.
Industrial Commission,83 had already clarified the Wisconsin Bridge &
Iron Company opinion and had treated the three-test provision as a
statutory definition distinct from the common-law test. The court's
description of the position taken by "a great majority of the states"
was clearly erroneous.
The Tennessee Supreme Court, on the other hand, in Texas Company
v. Bryant,4 followed the reasoning of the Utah court in the Fuller Brush
case, and held that the "ABC" definition is to be applied to determine
whether the relationship is excluded from employment only after it has
been determined by master-servant criteria that the relationship is
otherwise included. 85 This presents an interesting contrast with the
holding of the same court with respect to workmen's compensation
coverage that where a person performs services for another there is a
presumption that he is an employee and the burden is upon the prin-
cipal to show otherwise.86 Subsequent decisions of the Tennessee court
have left unclear the meaning of the statutory provisions. In Guaranty
Mortgage Company v. Bryant,7 the court, on the authority of the Fuller
81. See note 52 supra, and note 83 infra.
82. 152 Fla. 55,58, 10 So. (2d) 793, 794 (1942); see companion cases, Industrial Comm.
v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co., 152 Fla. 58, 10 So. (2d) 794 (1942) and Indus-
trial Comm. v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 152 Fla. 59, 10 So. (2d) 795 (1942).
83. 241 Wis. 200, 5 N. W. (2d) 743 (1942).
84. 178 Tenn. 1, 152 S. W. (2d) 627 (1941), reh'g denied, 178 Tenn. 680, 163 S. W. (2d)
71 (1942).
85. The court adopted the analysis of Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Comm., 99 Utal
97, 104 P. (2d) 201 (1940) in haec verba although the Utah decision was not cited.
86. Carter v. Hodges, 175 Tenn. 96, 132 S. IV. (2d) 211 (1939).
.87. 179 Tenn. 579, 168 S. W. (2d) 182 (1943).
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Brush case, held that real estate salesmen on a commission basis did
not render services for wages.83 In National Optical Stores Company v.
Bryant,u an eye expert engaged on a full-time basis with a guaranteed
income was held to be in employment. The court concluded that the
individual rendered services for wages, and distinguished the Guaranty
Mlfortgage Company case on that basis, but it did not state why it reached
that conclusion. The court then proceeded to apply the "ABC" tests,
but it treated them as though they were three disjunctive tests, whereas
they are clearly conjunctive, and failed to distinguish clearly the statu-
tory definition from common-law tests. And in Wolfe v. Bryant 1 the
court again treating the three tests as disjunctive, held certain services
not in "employment" because the "C" test was met; the "A" and "B"
tests were neither referred to nor discussed. Thus, although in more
recent decisions the court has given much less prominence than form-
erly to the rationale of the Fuller Brush case regarding proof of the
service relationship, it remains uncertain whether the cou~rt will in the
future give full significance to the "ABC" tests.
The Ohio Supreme Court has also taken the view that the "ABC"
tests are applied to determine whether a wage earner, who is a servant
at common law, is nevertheless excluded.91 In a series of cases involv-
88. The court, following the Missouri court in the A. J. y 'er case, held the statute
to be a taxing measure and subject to strict construction. Similarly in Wolfe v. Bryant,
181 S. 11. (2d) 343 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1944).
89. 181 S. XV. (2d) 139 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1944).
90. 181 S. W. (2d) 343 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1944).
91. Commercial Motor Freight, Inc. v. Ebright, 143 Ohio St. 127, 54 N. E. (2d) 297
(1944), reversing the position taken by the Ohio Court of Appeals in the came case, 51 N. E.
(2d) 293 (1943), and in State v. Iden, 71 Ohio App. 65. 47 N. E. (2d) 907 (1942).
The Ohio statute is more susceptible of such a construction than statutes of other [tatei.
The paragraph containing the "ABC" test [sub-paragraph (D) of paragraph (c)] is sutordi-
nated to the paragraph containing the broad introductory definition of employment [para-
graph (C)] rather than being a coiirdinate paragraph as in the statutes of other states.
Moreover, paragraph (c) of the Ohio definition provides that "employment" means csrice
performed "for remuneration under any contract of hire," rather than for remuneration cr
under any contract of hire as is the case generally in statutes containing the "ABC" tests.
The term "contract of hire" is also used in the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Law and has
been interpreted in terms of master-servant criteria. Covicllo v. Industrial Comm., 129
Ohio St. 589, 196 N. E. 661 (1935). The court, however, in the Cona:crcial Molor Frcig7.t
case did not rest on this distinction but rather on the subordination of sub-paragraph (Di
to paragraph (c). The decision does not satisfactorily discuss the import of sub-paragraph
(D) which provides that services for remuneration shall be deemed to be employment unlezs
and until it is shown that the ",ABC" tests are met.
Sub-paragraph (E) of paragraph (c) specifically excludes from coverage certain Eerv-
ices, indicating that it rather than sub-paragraph (D) is the exclusionary provision. Clauma,
(7) of sub-paragraph (E) excludes "service performed by an individual ...who is com-
pensated on a commission basis, and who ...is master of his own time and efforts, and
whose remuneration is wholly dependent on the amount of effort he chooses to expend."
Applied in Bowman v. Atkinson, 136 Ohio St. 495, 26 N. E. (2d) 798 (1940), and Hauswirth
v. Board of Review, 69 Ohio App. 79, 43 N. E. (2d) 240 (1941).
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ing claims for unemployment benefits, the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania has seemed to view the "ABC" tests as exclusionary in nature.0 2
But since -the Pennsylvania case law seems to provide substantially as
broad a view of the common-law relationship as is provided by full
application of the "ABC" definition, the adherence of the Superior
Court to common-law precedent seems to have worked little harm.93
Although drawing from the rationale both of the Washington Re-
corder and Fuller Brush decisions, the opinion of the Missouri Supreme
Court in A. J. Meyer & Company v. Unemployment Compensation
Commission,94 is noteworthy for the obvious aversion of the court to
92. Leinbach Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Board of Review, 146 Pa. Super. 237, 22 A.
(2d) 57 (1941). See Palumbo v. Unemployment Comp. Board of Review, 148 Pa. Super.
289, 25 A. (2d) 80 (1942); American Writing Machine Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Board
of Review, 148 Pa. Super. 299, 25 A. (2d) 85 (1942); Superior Life, Health & Accident Ins.
Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Board of Review, 148 Pa. Super. 307, 25 A. (2d) 88 (1942).
93. Under the Pennsylvania Act the Superior Court, the court of general appellate
jurisdiction, hears appeals from benefit decisions (sec. 510), while an inferior court, the
Court of Common Pleas for Dauphin County, considers appeals by employers from assess-
ment of contributions (sec. 304) and actions by the Commonwealth to collect contributions,
The Superior Court has not reviewed decisions of the latter court. The Court of Common
Pleas has seemed to take a narrower view of the employment relationship, apparently in-
fluenced in large measure by the fact that it is concerned with contribution liability. De-
partment of Labor and Industry v. Freeman, 55 Dauph. Cy. 112 (19,44). Commonwealth
v. Wysocki, 55 Dauph. Cy. 413 (1944). It has distinguished Superior Court decisions holding
claimants to be employees on the ground that they involved claims for benefits rather than
for relief from assessment of contributions. The Court of Common Pleas, however, cites the
Superior Court decisions as support when it holds that an employment relationship exists.
Commonwealth v. Wertz, 53 Dauph. Cy. 353 (1943); Commonwealth v. Marie Gas & Oil
Co., 56 Dauph. Cy. 200 (1944); Commonwealth v. McNelly, 56 Dauph. Cy. 95 (1944);
Commonwealth v. Cooper, 55 Dauph. Cy. 528 (1944); Walters v. Commonwealth, 56
Dauph. Cy. 245 (1945). Moreover, the Court of Common Pleas makes its own findings of
fact on the contributions issue while in cases before the Superior Court the findings of fact
of the administrative tribunal are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Insetting
forth the applicability of the "ABC" definition, the Court of Common Pleas, long after the
Washington Recorder case was overruled in that respect by the Washington Supreme Court,
quoted from that decision and approved the statement that the "ABC" definition is but a
restatement of the master-servant relationship. Further, without referring to the broad
declaration of policy contained in the Pennsylvania law (§ 3) proclaiming the Act to be in
the exercise of the police power for the public good and general welfare of the Common-
wealth, the court has indicated that in so far as contribution liability is concerned, the
unemployment compensation provisions may be less liberally construed than the Workmen's
Compensation Act which the legislature has directed be liberally construed. This position,
taken in Department of Labor and Industry v. Freeman, supra, is at variance with the view
expressed by the same court in Commonwealth v. Werlz, supra. Even considering contribu-
tions as "taxes," Commonwealth v. Perkins, 342 Pa. 529, 21 A. (2d) 45 (1941), the court
should not ignore the fact that the contribution and benefit sections of the law relate to a
single definition of covered employment. It may be hoped that the divergence of attitude
between this court and the Superior Court will be resolved by the Superior Court or by a
definitive decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
94. 348 Mo. 147, 152 S. W. (2d) 184 (1941). The decision was by Division One; subse-
quently a petition for certification to the court en banc was denied.
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the criterion of coverage prescribed by the legislature. Reversing the
administrative agency and the lower court, the court held that, as a
matter of law, the claimant, a commission real-estate salesman, was not
entitled to unemployment insurance benefits because he was not in
"employment." 11 The court avoided application of the statutory
definition by ignoring it. The court first observed that the title of the
Unemployment Compensation Act provides that its purpose is to es-
tablish a system of unemployment insurance. It then noted that a
Missouri statute provides that "words and phrases [of a statute] shall
be taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense" unless such would
be plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature, or of the contextsP
Therefore, the court consulted Webster's New International Dictionary
for the plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of "unemployment" and
noted that it meant "state of being not employed." The court con-
sulted the same authority for the meaning of the words "employ,"
"employer," and "employee." The last was defined as "one . . . in 
the service of another." The court found that it had said in a previous
decision 11 that the word "employ," when associated with the idea of
service, "implies control by the employer over the means and manner
of doing the work." The court then concluded:
"We do not think that it would be plainly repugnant to the intent
of the Legislature or of the context to say that the terms, nemploy-
ment, employment, employer, and employee are used in our Unem-
ployment Compensation Act 'in their plain or ordinary and usual
sense,' and so considered, these terms would be in harmony with the
definition of employment as given in the act."
At no point in the opinion does the court look for guidance to the
statutory definition of the word "employment," with which it is con-
cerned. The court decides in effect that when the legislature specifi-
cally defines a term for particular purposes within an act, the meaning is
to be found not in that definition but in the dictionary. It does so by
adopting the remarkable tactic of submerging the word it is concerned
with, "employment," in a sea of other words and then consulting
Webster as to the meaning of them all. Not only is the word "employ-
ment" specifically defined in the statute, but the words "unemploy-
ment" and "employer", for the meaning of which the court consulted
95. In Babb & Nolan v. Huiet, 67 Ga. App. 861, 21 S. E. (2d) 663 (1942) the Georgia
court gave the "ABC" definition broad application in a case involving real estate lakcmen
operating in substantially the same relationship as in the A. J. ! cr ca-s. Similarly,
Rahoutis v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 171 Ore. 93, 136 P. (2d) 426 (1943).
96. MIo. REv. ST.AT. A, ,. (1939) § 655.
97. Stein v. Battenfield Oil & Grease Co., 327 'o. 804, 39 S. IV. (2d) 345 (1931), in
which the statute contained the term "employed" ithout giving it a spzecific statutory
definition.
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Webster, are also specifically defined in the statute for the purposes of
the statute.98
Two other points raised by the court in the A. J. Meyer case deserve
mention. Observing that the Unemployment Compensation Act in-
cludes a taxing statute, inasmuch, as the unemployment compensation
fund from which unemployed persons derive benefit payments is made
up of moneys contributed by employers pursuant to the act, the court
concluded that it should be strictly construed. It would seem that a
contrary conclusion is indicated by the declaration of policy of the
act to which the court did not refer, and which emphasizes the remedial
nature of the law.99 The court overlooked the fact that the coverage
98. This approach seems more strange when as in this case, the court makes no effort
to ascertain whether the dictionary definition, which it fashions into the common-law control
criterion, is plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature as expressed in statutory defini-
tions.
The court looked for support for its conclusion in the fact that in the sections of the
act which determine the composition of the Unemployment Compensation Commission, the
advisory council, and the appeals tribunal, it is provided that certain of the members shall
be classified as representatives of "employers" or of "employees." The court concluded
from that: "It is quite clear . . .that the terms employer and employee as [there] used ...
are used in their ordinary and usual sense." The opinion does not explain how this justified
"giving a plain or ordinary meaning" to "employment" which was defined in the statute.
Nor did the court note that in none of the sections of the law providing for contributions by
"employers" or for the payment of benefits to individuals in "employment" is the word
"employee" used. In those sections, at each point at which it was necessary, the legislature
sedulously avoided the use of undefined terms, and used the terms "individual in employ'
ment by an employer," "employment" and "employer" having been given specific statutory
definitions. The court apparently believed that its opinion was well supported by the inter-
pretations of the "ABC" definition by five other courts: Hill Hotel Co. v. Kinney, 138 Neb.
760, 295 N. W. 397 (1940); Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Comm., 99 Utah 97, 104 P. (2d)
201 (1940); Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2) 718 (1939);
Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Ramsey, 233 Wis. 467, 290 N. W. 199 (1940); Unemploy-
ment Comp. Comm. v. Mathews, 56 Wyo. 479, 111 P. (2d) 111 (1941). The Wisconsin,
Washington, and Utah courts have subsequently clearly stated that the "ABC" provisions
in their respective statutes are broad in effect and not restricted to common law concepts,
In subsequent decisions the Missouri Supreme Court has not been faced squarely with
this question, the cases involving primarily the question whether persons who were clearly
employees of someone, were employees of one party rather than another. Hartwig.Dischln-
ger Realty Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 350 Mo. 690, 168 S. IV. (2d) 78 (1943)
(holding jariitor an employee of real estate management company, not of owner); Trianon
Hotel Co. v. Keitel, 350 Mo. 1041, 169 S. W. (2d) 891 (1943) (holding waiter an employee
of hotel, not of union hiring agent); Atkisson v. Murphy, 352 Mo. 644, 179 S. W. (2d) 27
(1944). However, in the most recent decision, Atkisson v. Murphy, sapra, with respect to
the question whether the manager-lessee of a hotel coffee shop (in which the employees in
question worked) was an employee of the hotel company, the court, in sustaining the ad.
ministrative tribunal's decision that an employment relationship existed, again entirely
ignored the statutory definition of employment and discussed the question solely in terms
of the master-servant control criteria.
99. The declaration of policy operative at the time of the decision in the instant case is
cited at note 34 supra. Subsequent to the decision this section was amended, the following
phrase being added: "This law shall be liberally construed. .. "
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definitions of the statute apply for benefits as well as contribution pur-
poses and that, indeed, the sole issue was whether an unemployed
claimant was entitled to receive unemployment benefits. It would
seem that the rule of strict construction applied to general revenue
measures should not apply when the exaction is but an incident of the
broad remedial purposes of the act, especially when the same definition
controls the benefit feature." ' Even less warrant is there for the use of
the rule to strike down, rather than construe, an express statutory
definition.
The court was apparently influenced also by the fact that the federal
act imposing an unemployment tax upon employers defined employ-
ment as "service . . . by an employee for his employer," 101 and that
the Bureau of Internal Revenue had held in an ex parte ruling issued
to the employer that the tax was inapplicable to the services of the
claimant. 0 2 But if the Missouri legislature did not intend to provide a
100. Contrast the follow.ng remarks of Judge Pratt in Logan-Cache Knitting Mills v.
Industrial Comm., 99 Utah 1, 26-7, 102 P. (2d) 495, 507 (1940), regarding the Utah Unem-
ployment Compensation Law: "In determining the purpose of an act of the Legidature we
should consider it as a unit. It is not under the police power in one breath, and under the
revenue power in the next, as the eye shifts from section to section. We should as: ours-Ave
what led to its passage. Was it the need of additional money, or was it some other purpoze
such as the eradication or restriction of an evil? I am digging a ditch. To do so, I bought a
shovel. Was my purpose in so acting merely the desire for the shovel? It might be humorous,
but it is hardly sensible to say that I am going to dig the ditch as an excuse to get the chovel.
Are we to say, then, that all these provisions referring to the public good and welfare, the
employment stabilization, the reduction and prevention of unemployment . . . are merely
creatures conceived as an excuse to raise revenue? It does not round reasonable. To me,
there is no question but that this act was passed under the police power of the state; and the
compensation fund is merely the shovel used to dig the ditch. It is merely incidental to the
purpose; the desire for it is not the purpose .... This court is on record ... a- rcc-
omizing that because an act includes sections of a revenue character, it does not follow that
the act must have been passed under the revenue powers of the state." See similarly Buell
v. Danaher, 127 Conn. 606, 18 A. (2d) 697 (1941); Young v. Bureau of Unemployment
Comp., 63 Ga. App. 130, 10 S. E. (2d) 412 (1940); Maine Comm. v. AndroTcoggin, 137
Me. 154, 16 A. (2d) 252 (1940); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. State Unemployment Comp.
Comm., 167 Ore. 142, 103 P. (2d) 703 (1940), alfd on reb'g, 167 Ore. 153, 116 P. (2d) 744
(1941). In Maltz v. jackoway-Katz Cap Co., 336 Mo. 1000, 32 S. W. (2d) 909 (1935) the
same Division of the Supreme Court, in holding a salesman to be an "employee" under the
state Workmen's Compensation Act, referred to the "well Imown practice of this court
* . . to apply sedulously the rule of liberal construction. Quite naturally and consistently
we have no disposition to depart from that rule.. .. " Id. at 1004, 82 S. NV. (2d) at 911.
101. IN . REv. CODE § 1607(c) (1939).
102. The court observed that although the 'Missouri act "is not circumscribed by the
federal act," the "federal act is undoubtedly the background of practically all of the State
Unemployment Compensation Acts." A. J. Meyer & Company v. Unemployment Comp.
Comm., 348 'Mo. 147, 161, 152 S. NI. (2d) 184, 190 (1941). See Commercial Motor Freight,
Inc. v. Ebright, 143 Ohio St. 127, 138, 54 N. E. (2d) 297, 302 (1944); Gentile Bros. Co. v.
Florida Industrial Comm., 151 Fla. 857, 862, 10 So. (2d) 563, 570 (1942). See United States
v. Vogue, Inc., 145 F. (2d) 609 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944), and Grace v. Magruder, 148 F. (2d)
679 (App. D. C. 1945), holding federal Unemployment Tax Act primarily remedial and its
taxing phase secondary and incidental.
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broader test of coverage than the federal statute, there would seem to
have been little purpose in prescribing the "ABC" tests which contrast
so sharply with the federal definition, and in requiring a showing that
all three tests are met in order to establish that the statutory relation-
ship does not exist.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES NOT USING
"ABC" DEFINITION
In states whose unemployment compensation statutes do not contain
the "ABC" definition, the courts vary in the scope given the employ-
ment relationship. The Kentucky and Mississippi Supreme Courts
have held statutes which contain no express reference to the common-
law master and servant relationship to be restricted to that relation-
ship.'3 The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in a case holding bulk sta-
tion operators who received petroleum products on a consignment
basis not in employment, concluded that the words "employer" and
"employee" must be considered to have been used in their ordinary
sense, the master and servant relationship. 104 Although the court noted
that the act itself provided that "it shall be liberally construed to ac-
complish the purposes thereof," the court concluded that inasmuch as
it involved the collection of contributions from employers it should be
strictly construed as a taxing statute. 105 The Mississippi Supreme
Court followed the same reasoning in two cases involving bulk station
operators ;' in the latter of the two cases, in which the relationship was
considered "near the line of demarcation," the court resolved the doubt
in "favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing power." Although in
both cases the court with a refreshing realism observed that the opera-
tors "are capitalists, investors, and employers instead of men whose
services are to be had for hire," it is doubtful, considering the emphasis
given the applicability of the master-servant relationship criteria, that
103. Kentucky: Barnes v. Indian Refining Co., 280 Ky. 811, 134 S. W. (2d) 620 (1939);
Commonwealth v. Potts, 295 Ky. 724, 175 S. W. (2d) 515 (1943); Radley v. Commonwealth,
297 Ky. 830, 181 S. W. (2d) 417 (1944). Mississippi: Texas Co. v. Wheeless, 185 Miss. 799,
187 So. 880 (1939); American Oil Co. v. Wheeless, 185 Miss. 521, 187 So. 889 (1939). The
Mississippi statute was amended in 1940 to provide expressly that the employment relation-
ship "shall be determined in accordance with the principles of the common law governing
the relation of master and servant." Subsequently in North American Ins. Co. v. Unem-
ployment Comp. Comm., 12 So. (2d) 925 (Miss. 1943), the court without opinion affirmed
the decision of the administrative tribunal, which had been affirmed by the lower court,
that the insurance agent in question was "a servant and not an independent contractor."
104. Barnes v. Indian Refining Co., 280 Ky. 811, 134 S. W. (2d) 620 (1939). The court
cited Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 237 U. S. 84 (1915) in which the Supreme
Court gave a similar construction to the coverage provision of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.
105. For criticism of this case see Note (1940) 29 Ky. L. J. 82.
106. Texas Co. v. Wheeless, 185 Miss. 799, 187 So. 880 (1939) and American Oil Co. v.
Wheeless, 185 Miss. 521, 187 So. 889 (1939).
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the court will extend the protection of the statute to those who are not
"capitalists, investors, and employers" unless the strict common-law
requirements are met.
In rather striking contrast to those decisions, the Connecticut Su-
preme Court of Errors, in construing a statutory definition of employ-
ment restricted to the common-law master and servant relationship,,'5
has given the definition a rather wide scope, applying the broad test
of "general control" developed in its workmen's compensation and tort
decisions, and has held that the statute is not to be treated as a taxing
statute and strictly construed but rather as clearly having a remedial
purpose and, therefore, to be construed liberally in order to accomplish
its purpose. Shortly after its decision in the first case before it involv-
ing unemployment insurance coverage, NVorthwestern Aht2ual Life
Insurance Company v. Tone,03 in which the court held that insurance
solicitors on a commission basis were not employees in the circum-
stances of the case, a decision which no longer has significant precedent
value,'01 the court in Jack and Jill, Inc. v. Tone"0 held ice cream route
salesmen to be employees, looking to the substance of a contract de-
signed to create a contrary appearance. The contract in question pro-
vided that the drivers were to "purchase" ice cream from the company
at less than a fixed retail price and to sell the product on routes "loaned"
for that purpose, and contained numerous provisions characterizinig
the driver as a "purchaser" and his activities as his "business." The
court concluded that the company had a "general control" over the
drivers' activities, stressing the power of the company to terminate the
arrangement at will.11 '
107. The statute has been amended to provide that after October 1, 1943, employmcnt
means the relationship of "employer and employee" rather than "master and Eervant."
108. 125 Conn. 183, 4 A. (2d) 640 (1939).
109. In this case the parties stipulated that no control was esxerciskd with re:Fect to the
place and manner in which solicitation was conducted or as to the time devoted to cuch
activities by the agent. Although it seems from the stipulation that "the Eubject of sale, the
terms of sale, and the proceeds of sale remained in the control of the Company," which the
court in Aisenberg v. C. F. Adams Co., 95 Conn. 419, 111 At. 591 (1920) had held consti-
tutes a "general control," the court did not distinguish the Aiscnberg case esicept to obkerve
that the factor of right to discharge, to which it had attached great importance in the Airer-
berg case, is not necessarily conclusive. More recently in Buell v. Danaher, 127 Conn. 606,
18 A. (2d) 697 (1941) the court distinguished the Norlhwesrlen Mutaril L-:fe Insurance Co.
case by noting that "that case was reserved for the advice of this court on an agreed state-
ment of facts while the case at bar resulted in quite a different finding made by a trial court
after a contested hearing." Thus the Nrorthwestern case now appears to be of very limited
precedent value. The Colorado court in Industrial Comm. v. Northwestern Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550, 564-5, 88 P. (2d) 560, 567 (1939), involving the same company and
the same contract, observed that "a reading of the opinion in the Connecticut ca-e will
disclose that the Supreme Court there placed a rather strained construction on the relation-
ship of master and servant as applied to its Unemployment Compensation Act."
110. 126 Conn. 114, 9 A. (2d) 497 (1939).
111. The court stated that the following language of Judge Cardozo in Matter of Glielmi
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Subsequently, in Buell v. Danaher,"2 the court more fully enunciated
its view regarding the scope of the statute. The case involved the
status of securities salesmen working on a commission basis. The
court, holding that an employment relationship existed for purposes of
the statute, stressed the fact that the principal furnished an office and
facilities (except transportation) for the salesmen's work, had a right
to designate what securities were to be sold, furnished the salesmen
with information which they were expected to use as a part of their
method of making sales, and retained the power of discharge. The
court gave particular emphasis to the fact that the activities of the
salesmen were in the furtherance of the principal's business and held
as reasonable the trial court's conclusion that since the advancement
of that business depends largely upon the method and manner in which
the salesmen operate and since it is therefore highly essential for the
principal to have a right to control the conduct of its salesmen in the
doing of its business, it must be inferred that it is implicit in the con-
tract of hiring that the principal does have that right.
v. Netherland Dairy Co., 254 N. Y. 60, 171 N. E. 906 (1930) (workmen's compensation
case), "fits almost with precision ...the case at bar": "The salesman has no discretion as
to the manner of performance, or none that is substantial. He travels a prescribed route from
which he may not deviate. If he fails to work it diligently, he knows that there will be an
end of his employment as surely as if he were working for a stated wage. On the one side
there is an intimacy of control and on the other a fullness of submission that imports the
presence of a 'sovereign,' as the master, we are reminded, was sometimes called in the old
books. . . .The contract is adroitly framed to suggest a different relation, but the differ-
ence is a semblance only, or so the triers of the facts might find." 126 Conn. 114, 120, 9 A.
(2d) 497, 499 (1939).
112. 127 Conn. 606, 18 A. (2d) 697 (1941). In this case the court rejected the view that
the statute in question was a taxing statute requiring a strict construction, and adopted the
view that it should be construed liberally.
The court reiterated its views expressed in a previous case, Beaverdale Memorial Park v.
Danaher, 127 Conn. 175, 15 A. (2d) 17 (1940), that where the determination of the adminis-
trative agency is made ex parte and without notice, the aggrieved party is entitled to a full
hearing in the trial court and that the trial court's determination as to the existence of an
employment relationship, which is considered a question of fact, is controlling if not errone-
ous as a matter of law. Thus the Buell case makes it clear that the tribunal which gives a
full hearing (whether it be the administrative agency or the trial court) may apply broad
criteria in determining the existence of the employment relationship for unemployment
compensation purposes, and gives considerable finality to the tribunal's determination of
that question.
The position taken in the Buell case appears not to have been modified by the later
decision of the court in Electrolux Corp. v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 342, 23 A. (2d) 135 (1941),
in which the court found no error in the trial court's determination that vacuum cleaner
salesmen working on a commission basis were not employees. The court was apparently
disturbed by the similarity of the fact situations existing in the Jack and Jill and Buell cases
to that in the instant case, and observed that "the determination of the status of individuals
similarly situated is often difficult," but pointed out that in those cases, as in the instant




The decisions of the New York Court of Appeals do not present as
consistent a pattern as might be hoped."' Nevertheless the substan-
tive content of the employment relationship is rather fully discussed
in two decisions. 1 4 In M11atter of M11orton "1 the claimant for benefits
was engaged by a company which manufactured and distributed,
through salesmen such as claimant, a line of made-to-order ladies'
undergarments. The saleswoman was compensated by the difference
between the wholesale price charged her by the company and the retail
price received by her from the customer. The agreement provided that
the company would give her the benefit of its training in corsetry and
salesmanship, which she agreed to practice and master; she agreed to
furnish the company with the names and addresses of clients and to
return samples and literature at the termination of the contract. The
contract was to run for one year, but it could be terminated by the
company if the saleswoman did not meet a sales quota. The Court of
Appeals indicated that the concept evolved in tort law, which had been
applied in cases arising under the New York Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law, was to be applied for unemployment compensation cases
also. But like the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors in Buel! v.
Danahzer, the New York Court of Appeals was impressed by the appar-
ent necessity of the company, in order to carry on an effective sales
program, to retain control over the general methods of salesmanship
113. A major determinant of its decisions appears to be the extent to which finality is
accorded the fact findings of the Appeals Board, the tribunal for appeals from decisions of
the administrative agency. The Court of Appeals has very strongly stated that such finding:
are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 'Matter of Morton, 284 N. Y. 167,
30 N. E. (2d) 369 (1940); Matter of Electrolux Corp., 28S N. Y. 440, 43 N. E. (2d) 4S0
(1942). Generally, where the Appellate Division affirms a decision of the Appzcals Beard
holding that an employment relationship exists, the Court of Appeals affirms the AppJlate
Division decisions. Matter of Scatola, 282 N. Y. 6S9, 26 N. E. (2d) 815 (1940) f neV-parcr
route carrier); Matter of Hanrahan, 287 N. Y. 559, 3S N. E. (2d) 227 (1941) (commis in
salesman); Matter of Wieder, 292 N. Y. 609, 55 N. E. (2d) 375 (1944); Matter of Dunne,
293 N. Y. 777, S8 N. E. (2d) 520 (1944) (commission securities salesman); Matter of Apfel,
293 N. Y. 869, 59 N. E. (2d) 451 (1944) (debit insurance collectors). But the Court of
Appeals has quite frequently affirmed decisions of the Appellate Division v hich reverzd
decisions of the Appeals Board holding that the employment relationship exists; it is not
always clear in these cases, however, that the Appeals Board findings of fact are withcut
substantial basis in evidence. See Matter of Levine, 283 N. Y. 577, 27 N. E. (2d) 439 (1940)
(commission salesman); Matter of Alford, 286 N. Y. 649, 36 N. E. (2d) 692 (1941) (came
question and same employer as Levine case); Matter of Fidel Ass'n, 287 N. Y. 626,39 N. E.
(2d) 265 (1941) (commission securities salesmen); Matter of NuBone Co., 287 N. Y. 710,
39 N. E. (2d) 933 (1942) (corset salesmen operating similarly to those in 'Morton card;
Matter of Bamaba Photographs Corp., 289 N. Y. 587, 43 N. E. (2d) 720 (1942) (free lance
photograph models); Matter of Wilson Sullivan Co., 3S9 N. Y. 110, 44 N. E. (2d) 387 (1942j
(commission real estate salesmen).
114. In-both cases the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstatcd
decisions of the Appeals Board which had held that the employment relationship existed.
115. 284 N. Y. 167, 30 N. E. (2d) 369 (1940).
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of its sales organization. The court emphasized that the company, and
not the saleswoman, determined the method of corsetry and technique
of salesmanship; this, concluded the court, was control over "the
manner in which the work was to be done."
Again in Matter of Electrolux Corporation,"'6 the Court of Appeals
was quick to look to the substance of an arrangement which was devised
to create an appearance of a vendor-vendee relationship."1 The agree-
ment specifically provided that while the company might make sugges-
tions as to the methods of handling and selling its products, the "sales
representative" could reject them if he wished and could devote such
time to "his business" as he deemed advisable and conducive to best
results. Salesmen were characterized as "independent-contractor con-
signees" and were advised that there was no limitation as to itineraries,
volume of business, hours, selling methods, reports, collections, sales
meetings, etc. The court at the outset emphasized that these salesmen
constituted the company's sole distribution system, and that the coin-
pany depended entirely on their canvassing to publicize and sell the
vacuum cleaners it manufactured. "Consequently it is a little difficult
to believe the protestations of respondent that it has not the slightest
interest, or wish to interfere, in the selling activities of its representa-
tives. . . ." The court discussed the findings of the Appeals Board
which indicated that the company operated its sales organization as an
integral part of its business, maintaining an effective control, although
in the form of suggestions, over the representatives' sales method.
The court concluded that from the facts of operation, ". . . especially
the right to terminate the contract upon short notice, it may be in-
ferred that respondent has erected a system of moral sanctions and
indirect compulsion which effectively regiment the activities of its
representatives into a pattern desired by respondent of minute and
detailed control. Under these circumstances, the expressed desires of
the employer, though couched in terms of suggestion, are quite as
effective as outright commands." 118
116. 288 N. Y. 440, 43 N. E. (2d) 480 (1942).
117. The court considered the arrangement to have been "deliberately framed to take
the... [salesmen]... out of the provisions of the unemployment compensation law."
118. 288 N. Y. 440, 446,43 N. E. (2d) 480,483 (1942). The California Supreme Court in
California Employment Comm. v. Los Angeles Downtown Shopping News Corp., 24 Cal.
(2d) 421, 150 P. (2d) 186 (1944) (newspaper carriers held employees), although not ex-
pressly rejecting the contention of the Commission that the statutory definition of "employ-
ment" ("service . . . performed for wages or under any contract of hire . . .") includes
not only common law employees but also "any relationship where the income of an indl-
vidual is dependent upon the will of another," applied the control criterion which it had
developed in respondeat superior and workmen's compensation cases; but the court empla-
sized that the unemployment compensation act is "a remedial statute and must be con-
strued for the purpose of accomplishing its objects." Subsequent to this decision the District
Court of Appeals, in B. P. Schulberg Productions; Ltd. v. Employment Comm., 66 Cal.
App. (2d) 831, 153 P. (2d) 404 (1944), observed that the legislature did not intend to incor.
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It is particularly notable that the attitude of the Connecticut and
New York courts, although they were interpreting a statute -without
definitional aids other than a declaration of policy, seems to have been
more effective in achieving results compatible with the purposes of the
legislation than the "ABC" definition, with all its specificity of criteria,
in the hands of less sympathetic courts."' It seems safe to say that the
Connecticut and New York courts, interpreting their respective stat-
utes, would not have reached the same results as courts of other states
in holding as a matter of law that employment relationships did not
exist under the "ABC" definition. This seems to indicate that the
success of specific statutory criteria of coverage depends ultimately
upon the ability and willingness of judges to perceive new policy objec-
tives of social legislation such as unemployment compensation laws,
and to read the statutes in the light of those objectives.
THE HEARST CASE
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in National Labor
Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inw.1 ' has very great signifi-
cance for the interpretation of coverage provisions of unemployment
compensation laws. The case involved the question whether the
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act applied to newsboys
who distributed daily papers of certain publishers on the streets of
Los Angeles. The Act extends to "employees"; however, the content
of the relationship thus characterized is not further defined in the Act
or in the regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. The
newsboys in question (who ". . . are generally mature men," the
Court observed 121) sold papers at fixed places. The "profit" derived
from their activities was the difference between the amount paid the
companies for the papers, which could be a credit transaction, and the
porate into the unemployment compensation act the common law master-.-cr-ant concept or
the definitions contained in the workmen's compensation act, but provided cplcific defni-
tions for unemployment compensation purposes. The court noted also that the act evidences
"a legislative intent to give the words a broad and liberal description to the end that the
far-reaching and evil effects of excessive unemployment may be eradicated." Id. at S35,
153 P. (2d) at 406. It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court vill give such -ub-
stance to its view of liberal construction as to hold in "employment" perons who may b2
servants under common-law criteria.
119. Thus the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Scatola, 282 N.Y. 6S9, 26 N. E.
(2d) 815 (1940), held newscarriers to be in employment while the Washington Supreme Court
in the Washington Recorder case held, under substantially the Fame facts, that as a matter of
law newscarriers were not in employment. And oddly, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in the
Mathews case, distinguished the "ABC" definition, which it restricted to common law rulec,
from the New York coverage provision by observing that "the New York law would appear
to be considerably broader and more inclusive in its phraseology than the Wyoming law."
56 Wyo. 479, 495, 111 P. (2d) 111, 117 (1941).
120. 322 U.S. 111 (1944), reh'g denied, 322 U.S. 769 (1944).
121. Id. at 116.
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amount received from the customer, which was fixed by the publishers.
The publishers furnished without charge certain equipment such as
racks and money-change aprons. The Board found that the newsboys
generally were required to be at the fixed spot from the time the papers
customarily appeared on the streets to the time settlement was made,
that in many instances newsboys had been transferred from one loca-
tion to another, and that the diligence of the newsboys was closely ob-
served by the publishers. On the review of the Board's order by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Board argued that although
the statute did not contain an elaboration of the term "employee,"
Congress contemplated a classification, larger than that envisioned by
common law, that would include all persons who ". , . function in a
realistic economic sense as employees of an industrial enterprise ..."and that the primary determinant should be "whether effectuation of
the declared policy and purposes of the Act comprehend securing to
the individual the rights guaranteed and protection afforded by the
Act." 122 The Court of Appeals, setting aside the Board order, con-
cluded that if Congress had intended to enlarge upon the common-law
meaning of "employee" it would have specifically so stated.123 The
court pointed to the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Robinson v. Baltimore &'Ohio Railroad Company that when Congress
used the words "employee" and "employed" in the Federal Employer's
Liability Act it intended to describe the "conventional relation of em-
ployer and employee." 124 The basic inquiry, the court continued, is
"where the right to control lies, and the control referred to must be
complete control of the means and methods of performance." 12 Con-
sidering the power of the publisher to terminate the relationship as
simply the choice of a wh6lesaler not to continue sales to a retailer, the
court found the newsboys to be vendees, and therefore independent
contractors, and held them not to be "employees" as a matter of law.
This decision the Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, it pene-
trated to the heart of the matter by discussing, as the paramount issue,
whether the term "employees" in the Wagner Act must be determined
by reference to "common-law standards." Considering first the nature
of the "common-law standards" the Court stated:
"The argument assumes that there is some simple, uniform and
easily applicable test which the courts have used, in dealing With
such problems, to determine whether persons doing work for others
122. Hearst Publications, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 136 F. (2d) 608, 612
(C. C. A. 9th, 1943).
123. Ibid.
124. 237 U. S. 84, 94 (1915). The Robinson case was heavily relied upon by the Ken-
tucky court in Barnes v. Indian Refining Co., 280 Ky. 811, 134 S. W. (2d) 620 (1939).
125. 136 F. (2d) at 612-3.
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fall in one class or the other. Unfortunately this is not true. Only
by a long and tortuous history was the simple formulation worked
out which has been stated most frequently as 'the test' for deciding
whether one who hires another is responsible in tort for his wrong-
doing. But this formula has been by no means exclusively control-
ling in the solution of other problems. And its simplicity has been
illusory because it is more largely simplicity of formulation than of
application. Few problems in the law have given greater variety of
application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the bor-
derland between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship
and what is clearly one of independent, entrepreneurial dealing.
This is true within the limited field of determining vicarious liability
in tort. It becomes more so when the field is expanded to include all
of the possible applications of the distinction.
"... It is enough to point out that, with reference to an identi-
cal problem, results may be contrary over a very considerable region
of doubt in applying the distinction, depending upon the state or
jurisdiction where the determination is made; and that within a
single jurisdiction a person who, for instance, is held to be an 'inde-
pendent contractor' for the purpose of imposing vicarious liability
in tort may be an 'employee' for the purposes of particular legisla-
tion, such as unemployment compensation." 1Z0
The Court concluded that any effort to apply "common-law standards"
in administering the Vagner Act would necessitate reliance for deci-
sion either upon the law of each of the states with the numerous varia-
tions and distinctions developed therein for wholly different purposes,
or "on a sort of pervading general essence distilled from state law." I'-
The Court rejected both alternatives, the first because it would result
in administering the statute ". . . in accordance with whatever differ-
ent standards the respective states may see fit to adopt for the disposi-
tion of unrelated, local problems," 12- and the second because the ad-
ministration of. the statute might soon "become encumbered by the
same sort of technical legal refinement as has characterized the long
evolution of the employee-independent contractor dichotomy in the
courts for other purposes." 12 It concluded that whether the term
"employee" in the Wagner Act includes particular persons "must be
answered primarily from the history, terms and purposes of the legisla-
tion." "I The Court found that "Congress had in mind a wider field
126. 322 U. S. at 120-2 (footnotes omitted), citing, by way of example, Glob. Grain &
Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm., 98 Utah 36,91 P. (2d) 512 (1939), reh1'g denicd, 93 Utah 43,
97 P. (2d) 582 (1939).
127. 322 U. S. at 122.
128. Id. at 123.
129. Id. at 125.
130. Id. at 124. However, the Supreme Court seemed to indicate, in Jikcuzing the
findings of fact by the Board, that even under "common-law" criteria an employment rea-
tionship existed. The Court observed that the publishers in a variet, of vways pre-Eribld,
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than the narrow technical legal relation of 'master and servant,' as the
common law had worked this out in all its variations, and at the same
time a narrower one than the entire area of rendering service to
others." 131
To determine "how much was included of the intermediate region
between what is clearly and unequivocally 'employment,' by any appro-
priate test, and what is as clearly entrepreneurial enterprise and not
employment," 132 the Court looked first to the Act's declaration of
policy, which was to encourage collective bargaining:
"The mischief at which the Act is aimed and the remedies it offers
are not confined exclusively to 'employees' within the traditional
legal distinctions separating them from 'independent contractors.'
Myriad forms of service relationship, with infinite and subtle varia-
tions in the terms of employment, blanket the nation's economy.
Some are within this Act, others beyond its coverage. Large num-
bers will fall clearly on one side or on the other, by whatever test
may be applied. But intermediate there will be many, the incidents
of whose employment partake in part of the one group, in part of
the other, in varying proportions of weight. And consequently the
legal pendulum, for purposes of applying the statute, may swing
one way or the other, depending upon the weight of this balance and
its relation to the special purpose at hand.
"Unless the common-law tests are to be imported and made ex-
clusively controlling, without regard to the statute's purposes, it
cannot be irrelevant that the particular workers in these cases are
subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute was
designed to eradicate and that the remedies it affords are appro-
priate for preventing them or curing their harmful effects in the
special situation.,' 133
The term "employee," the Court continued, "like other provisions,
must be understood with reference to the purpose of the Act and the
facts involved in the economic relationship. 'Where all the conditions
if not the minutiae of daily activities, at least the broad terms and conditions of work, and
that there were various "supervisory controls" by which the publisher's minimum standards
of diligence and good conduct were enforced; and it concluded that, "However wide may be
the latitude for individual initiative beyond those standards," supervisory instructions as to
what were regarded as "helpful sales technique" were expected to be followcd. Id. at 119.
131. Id. at 124.
132. Id. at 124-5.
133. Id. at 126-7. Referring specifically to the traditional control test of the employ-
ment relationship found in the Restatement, the Court observed that the economic rela.
tionships which Congress thought it necessary to affect do not embrace only those in which
controversies could be limited to disputes over proper "physical conduct in the performance
of the service," but that, on the contrary, "Congress recognized those economic relationships
cannot be fitted neatly into the containers designated 'employee' and 'employer' which an
earlier law had shaped for different purposes." Id. at 128.
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of the relation require protection, protection ought to be given.' " 134
The task of determining "where all the conditions of the relation require
protection," said the Court, " 'belongs to the usual administrative
routine' of the Board," "I' so that a determination of the Board, as in
the instant cage, that specified persons are "employees" under the
Act is to be accepted if it has warrant in the record and a reasonable
basis in law.
The Hearst decision has this significance for the interpretation of
unemployment compensation coverage provisions. First, it points up
the ambiguity of the "common-law standards," a matter which seems
to be so often ignored by courts which would appear to seek refuge from
the necessity of imaginative inquiry into the development of unem-
ployment compensation coverage criteria by attributing an assumed
simplicity and certainty to those "standards." Second, the Court
emphasizes the paramount importance of ascertaining the mischief
which the legislation is designed to remedy and of interpreting the
statutory definitions so as to achieve the legislative purpose. Thus,
even in the event that terms which are used in the statute in question
may also have been used in other statutes or at common law for unre-
lated purposes (for example, the word "employee" in the Wagner Act),
primary reference need not be made to such other fields to find the
content and scope of the terms, but rather to the history and policy
objectives of the particular legislation. The opinion in these respects
involves no departure from well-established legal principles, but their
vigorous restatement and elaboration by the Supreme Court may
vitalize the entire field of interpretation of coverage provisions in
social legislation.
It may be hoped that the Hearst decision will have some influence
upon courts which have appeared hostile or unsympathetic toward the
"ABC" definition of employment. Clear recognition of the policy ob-
jectives implicit in unemployment compensation legislation (generally
given expression in a "declaration of policy") and of the distinction
between those objectives and others which may underlie the doctrine
of respondeat superior, should lead courts to interpret the statutory
criteria in harmony with the objectives of the unemployment compen-
sation program.3 8 In the case of the Wagner Act the Court had no
134. Id. at 129 (footnote omitted), quoting from Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. YenEavage,
218 F. 547, 552 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
135. Id. at 130.
136. A clear grasp of the essential purposes of the legislation should preclude giving such
undue prominence to the contributions aspect of the program as to result in narrow and strict
construction. See note 100 supra. See Grace v. Magruder, 148 F. (2d) 679 (App. D. C.
1945), involving the question whether the employment relationship existed with respect to
"coal hustlers" for purposes of federal taxing provisions of the unemployment compensa-
tion and old-age and survivors' insurance programs; although these provisions are contained
in the Internal Revenue Code (Chapter 9, subchapters A and C) separate, in the case of the
19451
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difficulty in holding that "common-law standards" were inapplicable
to the simple term "employee," and that restricting the definition to
"common-law standards" would not do justice to the legislative intent.
Certainly, in states which have the "ABC" definition, courts should
have no difficulty in perceiving not only that there is a legislative in-
tention to strike at an evil which has no necessary relation to the policy
of the doctrine of respondeat superior, but that in the "ABC" defini-
tion criteria are prescribed for determining the employment relation-
ship which are at variance with the common-law criteria and which
are more clearly designed to facilitate effectuation of the purposes of
the unemployment compensation program.
The Hearst decision has an equally clear- import for those states
whose laws do not contain the "ABC" definition, but which, like the
Wagner Act, use more general terms. These statutes, too, have a
history and generally contain declarations of policy to which the
courts may refer to ascertain the legislative purpose. The I-rearst case
should influence courts, in interpreting these statutes, to disdain from
attributing to the legislature the intention of adopting the "conven-
tional" legal relationship of employer and employee and should lead to
judicial interpretations which are consistent with the legislative ob-
jective.
old-age and survivors' insurance tax, from the benefit provisions of the program, tile court
concluded that the predominant purpose of the legislation is remedial, that the taxing provi-
sions are but incidental, and therefore are to be construed liberally in favor of coverage.
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